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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In studying the American presidency, there is arguably no president that has received
more academic attention than Abraham Lincoln. Scholars and historians continue to strive to
better understand Lincoln as both an individual and as a president, perhaps because he
represented the country in such a unique era within history, as well as because of his
unprecedented rise to power despite the odds against him. Historian Richard Hofstadter
accurately captures the anomaly that Lincoln presents, writing,
“few have been able to point to such a sudden ascent from relative obscurity to high eminence;
none has maintained so completely while scaling the heights the aspect of extreme simplicity;
and none has combined with the attainment of success and power such an intense awareness of
humanity and moral responsibility . . .Keenly aware of his role as the exemplar of the self-made
man, he played the part with an intense and poignant consistency that gives his performance the
quality of high art” (1973, 93).
Lincoln is revered as one the greatest presidents that the United States has had, and much of his
prestige can be attributed to his ability to reunite the country and lead the Union to victory in the
Civil War. As president during a time of intense conflict and immense uncertainty, Lincoln was
forced to make extremely difficult decisions that had the potential to drastically influence the
outcome of the war. My rationale for my research lies in the greater curiosity I have to
understand presidential decision-making and how a president’s character and the resources that
they have around them affects the outcomes of the decisions that they choose to make. Lincoln’s
presidency offers a unique opportunity to better understand how presidents make key decisions
while in office and also the opportunity to try and recognize the presence of certain factors that
have the potential to influence the outcomes of those decisions.
My broad research question seeks to discover whether factors of character or structural
factors of the presidency better explain the success or failure of presidential decisions? My
hypothesis is that presidents that possess specific character elements that influence their ability to
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make good judgments and demonstrate strong political leadership will be more apt to make
successful decisions. My second hypothesis is that presidents that are able to persuade and
bargain with those around them, as well as have an understanding of their presidential power,
will make more successful decisions. The following chapter will include my literature review of
relevant material both on the political theories of character and strategic action. Character
literature will largely outline the work of foundational scholar James David Barber and political
scientist Stanley Renshon. Strategic action literature will focus on the work of political scientist
Richard Neustadt. The next chapter will then present my methodology and the two theoretical
frameworks that I have developed and will employ in analyzing three different case studies. The
following chapter will give a brief biographical history of Lincoln up until his election in 1860,
as it is important to know about and understand his life before he was elected president. The next
three chapters will present my three case studies, detailing key decisions that Lincoln made while
in office, to demonstrate a possible rationale for why some decisions are successful and some are
unsuccessful. The first case will focus on Lincoln’s successful decision to draft and implement
the Emancipation Proclamation. The second case will focus on Lincoln’s failure in his
management of General George B. McClellan. The third case will present Lincoln’s decision to
suspend to writ of habeas corpus in 1861. The final chapter will present my conclusions about
the individual cases and the usefulness of using the two theoretical frameworks in analyzing
presidential decisions.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Character Literature
In examining the role that personality or character plays in the presidency, political
scientist James David Barber provides the foundational theory in his book The Presidential
Character: Predicting Performance in the White House, originally published in 1972. In the book,
Barber aims to develop a way to understand and predict how presidents will act while in office
based upon three main elements: worldview, style, and character (Barber 1972). For the purpose
of this research, character will be the main element examined, but it is important to define the
other two elements as well. Worldview is defined by Barber as, “his [a president’s] primary,
politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and
the central moral conflicts of his time” (Barber 1972, 7). It is the way in which a president views
and understands the world in which he lives. Style is, “the President’s habitual way of
performing his three political roles: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework” (Barber 1972,
7). This is based largely on how a president acts and goes about what his role as president
requires of him.
Barber defines the third and final element, character, as, “the way the President orients
himself towards life- not for the moment, but enduringly. Character is the person’s stance as he
confronts experience” (Barber 1972, 8). The element of character is mainly developed during
childhood. It does not determine what a president’s style or worldview will be, but it does
provide the broad direction for the other two elements to develop (Barber 1972). The core of
Barber’s argument is that presidential character can be defined according to four types, which are
configured from two baseline elements. The first baseline element is activity-passivity, which is
defined as how much energy a president invests into his job (does he throw himself into his work
or does he simply do his job as conditions arise?), and the second baseline element is positive-
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negative affect, which is the level of enjoyment a president feels about their job in the political
sphere (Barber 1972).
From these two dimensions, Barber creates the four basic character patterns, i.e. the four
types of presidents, the active-positive, the active-negative, the passive-positive, and the passivenegative (Barber 1972). Barber admits that no individual president solely fits within one category
but that these types simply predict tendencies (Barber 1972, 7). To summarize each type briefly,
the active-positive is both very involved in and enjoys the position as president, oftentimes
possessing high self-esteem and high productivity levels. The passive-positive enjoys their
position, but, instead of using their position to move the country forward, they are constantly
striving to please and receive affection from those around them and they mostly act out of
compliance. The passive-negative largely performs their role as president out of a sense of duty
or service and finds little enjoyment in their job, only serving their role because they feel they
ought to. The active-negative is one who pours themselves into their job, but emotionally they
struggle with their image and their sense of power, oftentimes possessing strong ambition but
low self-esteem (Barber 1972, 12).
Barber takes a special interest in the active-negative type, as he believes them to be the
most dangerous type to have in office. He writes that, “For the active-negative Presidents
especially, character is key” (Barber 1972, 58). He presents five tendencies/themes that can be
identified among active-negative types using presidents Woodrow Wilson, Lyndon Johnson, and
Herbert Hoover as examples. One theme that Barber articulates is The Answer in Effort, in
which a president will experience a severe depression as a particular policy unfolds. He throws
himself into his work, loses himself in the task, and will then experience feelings of intense pain
and self-sacrifice, spiraling into depression (Barber 1972, 57). A second theme Barber develops
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is The Lone Struggle, where, as a policy develops, the president feels entirely responsible for the
success of the policy and feels that he must bear the weight alone, often turning away from
trusted advisors (Barber 1972). A third tendency is the Fight Against “Giving In” mentality. Here
one can see a president who sees an issue as a conflict of strength and weakness. To give in
would sacrifice one’s credibility and integrity and the fear of being labeled as soft compels them
to persevere and to not give in (Barber 1972). A fourth tendency is The Appeal to Faith, where a
president feels that they are the bearer of the nation’s promises, so they transform a policy
problem as a matter of emotional ideals (Barber 1972, 57). The fifth and final tendency is The
Emergent Enemy, in which a president becomes so frustrated from trying to enact his policies,
that he will tend to rigidify around a common enemy who he believes is a major threat to his
goals. From all of these tendencies, Barber’s thesis about active-negative presidents is that, “in
each case, highly significant policy failures were rooted in the President’s character, which . . .
pressed him to persevere rigidly in a disastrous policy” (Barber 1972, 95). These tendencies that
Barber has identified can serve as predictors in identifying active-negative presidents. It is not
necessary for an active-negative president to showcase all five of them, but the appearance of a
few of them signals a potential active-negative type.
While several of Barber’s analyses seemed to have correctly predicted the behavior of
certain presidents, namely Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush, there remains a consensus
among many political scholars in the inadequacy of Barber’s theory on its own and even more so
in explaining presidents. One of the main issues of contention between Barber and his critics is
the adequacy of the use of an individual simple typology versus employing a more complex
typology (Tulis 1982, George 1974). Alexander George, the first critic of Barber’s theory on
presidential character, enumerates two main issues that he has with Barber’s approach. The first
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is the issue of Barber’s typology of character. George calls Barber’s model the “file-drawer”
approach in that he fails to transform his four pure character types into a larger group of subtypes
(George 1974). According to Barber’s theory, the character type that defines a president may be
an indicator of his dominant character but it fails to capture his whole being (George 1974).
George writes that, “Barber’s use of a primitive, undeveloped variant of the file-drawer approach
. . . leaves the reader uncertain of the adequacy of his diagnoses of the Presidents for the task at
hand” (George 1974, 275). The four pure types that Barber creates are not sufficient or
developed enough to truly characterize a president, and George believes that it is challenging to
utilize Baber’s theory because of the inadequacy of the simple typology.
The second main issue that George has with Barber’s theory is Barber’s dependence on
solely using character to explain behavior and failing to take into account situational factors.
According to George, relying solely on character cannot predict behavior. George believes that a
variety of constraints and numerous variables affect presidential performance, and that one must
understand past behavior in previous situations, as well as the complex inconsistencies of an
individual’s personality (George 1974). George writes that, “although Barber is fully aware of
and warns against the kind of psychological reductionism that has long plagued
psychobiography, the difficulty of the task places him in jeopardy of committing this cardinal sin
himself” (George 1974, 255).
This is not to suggest that George believes Barber’s theory is totally useless. He believes
that Barber’s work does have value, but that it contains a number of inconsistencies and can only
be used as a starting point for the diagnosis of an individual (George 1974). George articulates
three possibilities for remedying the flaws in Barber’s theory. The first possibility is to add in
mixed types that would help to develop a more complex and sophisticated typology (George
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1974, 277). George thinks there are particular issues with the dimensions of the active-passive
and positive-negative types in the way that they are defined. There is both a clarification problem
and a usefulness problem. The ambiguity between the dimensions concerning whether they are
dichotomous (either a person is active or passive, positive or negative), or the dimensions are a
continuum (each individual is placed at a point on the dimension) is not clear (George 1974).
Also, the nature of “activity” and its significance in personality differs greatly from individual to
individual. The dimension of positive-negative also has issues in that it does not take into
account ambivalence towards one’s activity (George 1974).
The second possibility would be to do the opposite of adding in mixed types, but to
simplify the present typology. Barber’s typology is overambitious in that it attempts to link too
many variables into the four types and it would be more useful to formulate simpler
classifications that do not result in personality types via a deductive formula (George 1974, 278).
The final possibility, which George recognizes as the most difficult, would be to transition the
typology from its present use as a classifying method to an ordering procedure, where
individuals would be arranged along several axes that contain subtler distinctions (George 1974,
278). George concludes that none of these three possibilities would address the issue of the
validity of Barber’s typology, which should be prioritized over fixing the pure typology, so from
George’s critique it can be understood that there are many aspects of Barber’s theory that must
be clarified and strengthened in order for it to be a useful political theory.
Political scholar James Qualls also provides a critique of Barber’s work in The
Presidential Character. He provides a nice summary of the critiques already offered, including
George’s, and he builds off of George’s two main issues with Barber’s theory, writing that, “Just
as an accurate prediction cannot establish that Barber’s accentuation of personality and character
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is correct, so such a prediction cannot establish that the relationships Barber draws between the
components of character are true” (Qualls 1977, 185). Qualls suggests that if one looks to
Barber’s earlier work, which examines the character of Connecticut legislators, the problems of
reductionism are clearly evident in Barber’s earlier work, serving to foreshadow the issue of
reductionism that Barber has with his later theories on presidential character (Qualls 1977).
Qualls concludes in saying that it is not easy to characterize a certain individual by type and that
the conclusion may not be accurate even with the right information (Qualls 1977). For Qualls,
Barber’s character typology may have predicted the behavior of some presidents correctly, but it
remains largely reductive and inconsistent, just as his earlier work was.
Political scientist Douglas Hoekstra attempts to apply Barber’s personality theory to
Lincoln in order to ascertain the concrete applicability of Barber’s theory to additional
presidents. He believes that in examining a president like Lincoln, Barber’s approach is largely
useless (Hoekstra 1989). Hoekstra defines Lincoln as an active-negative president based upon
Jeffrey Tulis’ work “On Presidential Character and Abraham Lincoln”. In this piece, Tulis gives
several examples demonstrating Lincoln’s active character, including that he started his day early
around seven in the morning and would work long into the nights, he refused to limit visiting
hours so that he could meet with and hear the concerns of all of his visitors, and he kept in
constant communication with advisers, especially within the War Department (Tulis 1982). Tulis
provides clear evidence that Lincoln was an active type, but the more difficult question is
whether Lincoln was more negative or positive. Tulis incorporates several of the tendencies that
Barber articulates as behavior of potential active-negative presidents. First was the tendency that
Lincoln had in his rhetoric to stress his faith in himself and also to appeal to the will of God.
Here, one can see the tendency of the Appeal to Faith, where a president feels that they have the
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duty to keep their promises to the nation and also that they transform a policy problem as a
matter of emotional ideals, oftentimes through religious appeals. Lincoln’s notion of appealing to
faith and to his sense of duty was a main factor in his belief that his policies were the right ones.
A second tendency that can be identified is the Fight Against “Giving In” tendency, as Lincoln
rarely backed down or reversed a decision once it was made (Tulis 1982).
Hoekstra concludes through Tulis that Lincoln clearly was an active-negative president,
however he believes that there are instances where it is clear that Lincoln does not demonstrate
characteristics of an active-negative. A key indicator of an active-negative president is that they
will “tend to rigidify around a failing course of action, particularly in times of crisis” (Hoekstra
1989). However during the Civil War, Lincoln showed incredible perseverance and diligence in
the midst of multiple military defeats and amid political chaos, exactly the opposite of how a
typical active-negative would act (Hoekstra 1989). Another example highlighting the failure of
Barber’s theory explaining Lincoln’s character is that Barber believed that, “Only those with
high self-esteem are secure enough to lead as democratic leaders must lead, with persuasion and
flexibility as well as action and initiative” (Nelson 1982, 79). However, Lincoln is known as an
individual who, at times throughout his life and presidency, had low self-esteem and personal
self-doubt, however he was still able to lead as a leader must lead. Therefore, according to
Hoekstra, it cannot be concluded from Tulis or from Barber that Lincoln can be identified as a
true active-negative president. A critique of Barber’s theory that can be identified through this
conclusion is that perhaps Barber’s typologies can only describe “normal” presidents. Tulis
writes that, “The ‘great’ presidents pose special difficulties because they are supposed to have
minds that are incapable of description according to criteria simple and formal enough to be
applied to most men” (Tulis 1982, 99). These presidents would include Lincoln, as he was
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known and is remembered as a great leader, therefore Tulis concludes that Barber’s theory may
be useful, but only to describe those presidents considered mediocre (Tulis 1982).
A clarifying point, one that critics of Barber oftentimes fail to see or understand, is that
Barber’s typology is not used to diagnosis individuals with a certain character type while they
are president, but that there are noticeable tendencies of a particular type that occur before a
president enters office. What Tulis and others have done is diagnosis presidents based on actions
or decisions that they make while in office, but Barber never intended his theory to be use to
diagnosis presidents. He wanted to use typology to predict how presidents would act if elected,
so those particular critiques of the applicability of Barber’s theory to presidents in office, while
accurate, are slightly misguided.
Political scholar Michael Nelson seems to be both a critic and a supporter of Barber’s
theory. He believes that there are major flaws in Barber’s theory, but he emphasizes that it
remains a serious political theory and has contributed majorly to the field. Barber’s concentration
on the significance of presidential personality and his boldness in approaching his theory in a
way that will inform and help voters predict what type of president an individual will become
have both have been important contributions (Nelson 1982). However, Nelson believes that
Barber’s defense of his own theory, which is that one only needs to look at his successful
prediction of the downfall of Richard Nixon while in office, is not very strong. Despite Barber’s
weak defense, Nelson believes that the elements of Barber’s theory have sufficiently proven to
be predictors of behavior and that they deserve to be more carefully considered and evaluated
(Nelson 1982).
Barber provides somewhat of a response to his critics in a piece that he wrote twenty
years after his original work was published in 1972. He does not call out any specific critics or
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their remarks, but he reiterates the importance that his theory has in predicting how presidents
will perform while in office. He clarifies part of his theory, stating that predictions will not work
in a comprehensive sense, but only in a sense that would be limited to personality as a major
factor (Barber 1992). He writes that, “the more plausible project is to concentrate on a continuity
of personality carried forward by the president and likely to interact with whatever external
politics he faces” (Barber 1992, 543). This, in a sense, attempts to deal with the criticism that
Barber’s theory doesn’t consider situational factors. In Barber’s original work, he does touch
upon two situational factors, Power Situation and the Climate of Expectations, which he defines
but perhaps doesn’t utilize as much as he should. In the rest of the article, Barber showcases how
his predictions have oftentimes been very predictive and successful, using Nixon, Ford, Reagan,
and George H.W. Bush as examples (Barber 1992, 543). He uses these successful predictions in
responding to his critics that if my theory has so many problems, how I have been able to
accurately and correctly predict the behavior of several modern presidents? Barber acknowledges
that his theory isn’t perfectly predictive, but that it has had considerable success applied to
several presidents and for that reason he emphasizes that the idea of predicting the behavior of
presidents can be highly useful.
After closely examining Barber’s foundational theory on presidential character, it is
worthwhile to step back and evaluate the topic of presidential character more broadly and
analyze the usefulness of studying individual leaders over other potential political approaches.
Central to the question that political scholar Erwin Hargrove tackles is, how do the elements of
leadership fit into these personality theories? Does the individual who is the president really
matter or is it the historical conditions in which they find themselves in that matters? Hargrove
presents three objections to the study of political leadership. The first is that individuality is too

12
great a wild card and that there are too many varying factors that make developing a general
theory on presidential character impossible. Instead the study of political leadership must be both
historically and institutionally specific (Hargrove 1993, 70). A second objection from Hargrove
is that the study of leadership is like quicksilver, in that it is largely elusive and there is the
potential for information to slip through the cracks (Hargrove 1993). This makes it difficult to be
able to link the actions that leaders make with their possible consequences for society. A third
objection is that one does not need to look at individuals and their impact, but that the concept of
the institutional role of the presidency will suffice (Hargrove 1993). Similar political pressures
and situations will cause different individuals to act in much the same way regardless of their
character, therefore simply analyzing the institution itself is sufficient.
Despite these objections, Hargrove still believes that there is plenty of opportunity for
expression of individuality through leadership. Thus far, presidential studies have not done a
good job in sorting out what types of areas individuality can be exemplified in. One example that
permits one to see the individuality of leaders is provided by scholar Fred Greenstein, who writes
that “the greater the demands on the leader to act at high levels of skill, the more likely
individuality will be expressed” (Hargrove 1993, 72). This indicates that crisis and high-pressure
situations are an area in which individual leadership is more easily exposed. Another area in
which individuality can be expressed is when presidents are dealing with ambiguous situations,
where there is no set way in which a president must act (Hargrove 1993). Thus Hargrove
concludes that personality, role, and situation are inextricably joined, and it is essential that a
dynamic and more complex model of political personality, specifying aspects of individuality, be
developed (Hargrove 1993, 72).
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Hargrove develops two models of political personality. The first model showcases that
beliefs and values, cognitive style, and needs ! ego ! creates synthesis and congruence. The
second model is that political personality ! policy purpose and to political and administrative
style (Hargrove 1993, 75). What Hargrove’s models do is link political personality with
situations that leaders face in the time that they are in office. Leadership style is defined by
Hargrove as, “the characteristic ways in which a political leader deals with recurring tasks of
leadership such as persuasion, the management of conflict, and administration” (Hargrove 1993,
75). Hargrove makes an important connection between leadership and character writing that,
“Leadership behavior is something more than rational choice of intelligent strategies. To a great
extent it is intuitive and is an expression of personality in the fullest sense” (Hargrove 1993, 76).
Hargrove also considers the importance of political skill in his discussion of leadership.
He develops a chart that aims to rank and compare the impact of presidents on history. Within
the chart, there are two continuums, one of which is the level of political skill and the other is the
state of conditions presidents find themselves in (Hargrove 1993). This framework is most useful
for the comparison of presidents, as it permits the analysis of political skill in assessing the
contribution of individuality to presidential success and failure within specific conditions
(Hargrove 1993). The most important skill, according to Hargrove, is called “strategic
leadership” which he defines as, “the capacity to discern where history may go and to reinforce
that direction by skillful action” (Hargrove 1993, 85). He also outlines three components of
presidential leadership that are, “1) policy purposes, 2) consideration of the politics of action in
relation to purpose, and 3) the management of decision-making” (Hargrove 1993, 85). Hargrove
contributes greatly to the field in that he both connects and distinguishes the elements of
leadership and personality. He is able to link the two to come up with a more comprehensive
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theory that takes into account character/personality features, but also contextual and situational
factors as well.
Turning to an additional scholar that has contributed to the field of presidential
personality, Fred Greenstein provides six qualities that he believes shape presidential
performance. The first quality is the effectiveness as a public communicator (Greenstein 2000,
180). A president’s ability in communicating with the public is essential in gaining trust and
respect. The second quality is organizational capacity. This includes the ability of a president to
forge a strong team of advisors and to create effective institutional arrangements (Greenstein
2000). The third quality is political skill. Political skill means the way in which a president puts
his mark on public policy through how they build and maintain public support and establish their
reputation (Greenstein 2000, 182). The fourth quality is policy vision, which means the extent to
which a president’s policy views inform his actions (Greenstein 2000). The fifth quality is
cognitive style, which is how the president processes the information and the advice from his
advisors and the sixth and final quality is emotional intelligence. This includes how a president
manages his emotions, whether they dominate him and they undermine his performance, or if he
is able to turn them into a constructive motivator (Greenstein 2000).
The final political scholar to consider in looking at presidential character is psychologist
and political scientist Stanley Renshon. Renshon considers both psychological elements and
political elements in conceiving of the presidency and the impact of the individual in that role.
For Renshon, “the presidency is an office where its occupant’s psychology counts” (Renshon
2000, 43). Renshon, similar to Barber, believes that character matters when conceiving of the
presidential role. Renshon defines character as, “an individual’s core psychology: It is the set of
values, behaviors, and perspectives that show continuity over time and across situations. It is the
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patterns of choice and response across time and circumstances” (Renshon 2004, 52). Despite the
limitations of law, precedent, and competing institutions, there is a vast area of opportunity for
presidential discretion and this is where a president’s character is revealed (Renshon 2004).
Instead of identifying specific typologies of character like that of Barber, Renshon advocates that
it is more useful to analyze the psychology of a president from three basic domains, which form
the foundation of character: ambition, character integrity, and relatedness (Renshon 2004, 53).
Renshon theorizes that these three elements are interrelated and can be identified in presidents
before they are elected to office, however these elements do not provide exclusive
categorizations or types like Barber’s theory does (Renshon 2000).
Ambition is, “a president’s (person’s) level of desire to achieve his purposes, and the
skills he is able to bring to bear on accomplishing them” (Renshon 2000, 44). Ambition includes
both personal and political skills, including self-regard and self-interest, that can be utilized in
the pursuit and accomplishment of one’s goals and values (Renshon 2004; Renshon 1996). The
element of ambition has two theoretical advantages. One is that ambition is a motivational
element that appears to be a prerequisite for achieving a position in high public office (Renshon
1996). The second advantage is that, regardless of the level of ambition that a president
possesses, such as a president who amasses power out of ambition from having low self-esteem
(like Barber’s active-negative), or a president who is more oriented towards achievement,
ambition is a common and underlying element to both types of stances (Renshon 1996). Renshon
admits that there are problematic issues with ambition, because ambition can be either productive
or problematic, and he believes that it is important to view ambition in relation to the other
character domains to better understand it (Renshon 1996).
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Character integrity, “refers to the ideals and values by which the candidate says he lives
and his fidelity to them” (Renshon 2000, 44). There are two different perspectives regarding
character integrity. One is how others view the degree to which the individual possesses a set of
genuine beliefs and values that inform his choices and commitments. The second perspective
regards a person’s interior psychology, which is how he views himself (his self-esteem and
personal identity) and the level to which he has acted on his beliefs (Renshon 2000; Renshon
1996). Overall, character integrity reflects the president’s ability to commit and maintain
boundaries and ethics regarding his ideals and values (Renshon 2004). The criterion with which
one demonstrates fidelity to their ideals and values is that first that one must have the capacity to
endure loss and second is that one must be able to endure conflict and a degree of separateness
from others (Renshon 1996). Ambition and character integrity are related in that possessing
strong ideals and values provides a foundation for the ethical framework in which one’s
ambitions can be pursued (Renshon 1996). In addition, Renshon utilizes the conception of
ambition from scholar Heinz Kohut, who notes that, “ambition in the pursuit of one’s ideals,
many of which are socially valuable, is an integral part in the development of a strong and
favorable sense of self” (Renshon 1996, 190).
The final element, relatedness, “refers to the basic nature of the candidate’s interpersonal
relations, his stance toward others” (Renshon 2000, 44). There are differing circles of
relationships that the president has and there is a different degree of closeness within each circle.
Those individuals within the inner circle have a very close relationship with the president; these
are likely his most trusted advisors. He also will have circles that contain highly antagonistic
relationships (Renshon 2004; Renshon 1996). The successful development of the previous two
domains of ambition and character integrity rests on a variety of productive interpersonal
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relationships, thus relatedness depends heavily on the elements of ambition and character
integrity (Renshon 1996). Character integrity is connected with the domain of relatedness in two
central ways. The first is that ideals oftentimes develop out of the relationships and the influence
that others have on our lives. The second is that our sense of self is intimately tied to the
relationships that we have with others (Renshon 1996). Regarding ambition, the interpersonal
relationships that one has with others have a significant effect on ambition, as relationships of
cooperation versus competition can have a significant influence on one’s level of ambition
(Renshon 1996).
Renshon writes that, “These elements, and the associated patterns that develop from
them, are put forward as useful frames for the analysis of the two crucial dimensions of
presidential performance, judgment and leadership” (Renshon 1996, 203). Renshon believes that
that each of the three character elements of ambition, character integrity, and relatedness
influences what he deems the two pillars of presidential performance: leadership and judgment
(Renshon 2004). He emphasizes that if character is relatively stable and consistent, an
examination of a candidate’s personal and political history can provide valuable information for
how he might handle his presidential responsibilities, which can be seen through their judgment
and leadership (Renshon 1996).
Presidential judgment is essentially a president’s ability to match solutions to
circumstances, in that he can identify a problem, see it for what it is, and devise an appropriate
solution (Renshon 2004). Regarding why good judgment is important, Renshon writes that, “We
expect our president to manage the domestic economy, ensure domestic tranquility, and keep
Americans safe at home and powerful abroad. We give him the technical means to do sobudgets, troops, advisers, and staff- and an almost endless list of resources he can call upon. Yet,
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few modern presidents have been considered outstanding” (Renshon 2003, 25). For Renshon, the
amount of resources that a president has at his disposal influences very little if a president cannot
make good judgments regarding the problems that he faces. He defines judgment as, “the quality
of analysis, reflection, and ultimately, insight that informs the making of consequential
decisions” (Renshon 1996, 207). Assessing judgment requires four considerations: the problem
itself, the context(s) within which decisions are made, the actual decisions that were made, and
the results of those decisions (Renshon 1996). It consists of both a president’s reflective and
analytical abilities and the nature of the problem to be faced (Renshon 1996).
Renshon also addresses the question of is good judgment situational? He answers that
there are some basic character elements, presumably the three character domains, that would
seem to point to good judgment, however good judgment is also connected to specific domains
and problems that are generated by experience (Renshon 1996). He reiterates his point that
character is enacted in patterns and that the psychological domains underlie the enactment
patterns because they are consolidated and continue over time (Renshon 2003). This suggests
that one could have good judgment regardless of the situation, as they would act according to
their character patterns, not to the situation in which they find themselves. So the answer to
Renshon’s question is that good judgment can be situational, but also it depends upon character
elements and the level of experience of the president in office. Character and judgment are
largely connected in that judgment reflects a combination of knowledge, experience, and insight,
but it also requires a consolidated set of character domains that are strong and can withstand the
decision-making process (Renshon 1996). He believes that good judgment can be contextually
specific, but that poor judgment is systematic (Renshon 2003, 30). Poor judgment can result
from unrestrained ambition, as well as failure to recognize or acknowledge crucial risks within a
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problem (Renshon 2003). Good judgment reflects having a developed and consolidated
professional and personal identity, and in making and maintaining a range of positive
interpersonal relationships (Renshon 2003, 33).
Renshon writes, “I argue that substantially developed character capacities are
instrumental, if not necessary, correlates to good judgment. However it is clear that good
judgment is a necessary but insufficient element in presidential performance” (Renshon 1996,
223). This is where the second pillar of political leadership comes in. He defines it as the
capacity to act based upon one’s judgments, and also the ability to translate judgment into
effective policies (Renshon 1996). The “president’s attempts to mobilize, orchestrate, and
consolidate activity in the pursuit of presidential goals” highlight the three distinctive aims of
presidential leadership (Renshon 2004, 54). Mobilization refers to the president’s ability to
stimulate the public. He must be able to anticipate problems and educate the public about them,
as well as invest himself in solving the problem (Renshon 1996). Orchestration refers to the
application and shaping of mobilization in a specific policy way to achieve one’s goals (Renshon
1996). Finally, consolidation refers to the skills that help to preserve a president’s supportive
relationships and the institutionalization of one’s policy judgments (Renshon 1996). Political
leadership, like judgment, is strongly related to character. The character domains of ambition and
integrity are especially important in the aims of mobilization and orchestration, as it takes a
strong level of desire and strong fidelity to one’s values and ideals to be able to mobilize the
public and orchestrate policy decisions (Renshon 1996). Strong political leadership also is
strongly affected by the ability to make and maintain personal relationships, indicating the third
character domain of relatedness, so each of the three character domains have a significant
influence on political leadership.
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Renshon emphasizes that a president’s psychology is not synonymous with character, but
that one’s character reveals psychological patterns that can be identified and help to show an
individual’s strengths and limitations. These patterns are built into the foundation of character.
The particular patterns that Renshon identifies are persistence, impatience, the need to be special,
the wish to have it both ways and the dislike of boundaries, taking risks, taking responsibility,
competition, and achievement (Renshon 2000). He developed these patterns in his book High
Hopes and in The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates.
Renshon provides a useful application of his theory applying it to the Clinton presidency.
He indicates that Clinton clearly had a high level of ambition, shown through his effort within
his campaigns, both for governor and for president, and his perseverance and high energy
(Renshon 2000, 45). Regarding his character integrity, this was a large element in Clinton’s
governorship and presidency in that he constantly had to defend his values and beliefs. There
were two sides of Clinton: one that was the focused and effective Clinton and the one that caved
in to external correction and was more impulsive (leading to many screw-ups) (Greenstein 1998,
180). Clinton’s positions on certain policies tended to change depending on what side of Clinton
was strongest at that particular moment, which doesn’t show strong character integrity of
sticking to one’s ideals (Greenstein 1998). Clinton’s relatedness is demonstrated through strong
interpersonal relations, stemming from his desire to receive validation from others. He needed
and wanted others to accept the view of himself that he had created (Renshon 2000).
What is interesting about Renshon’s theory is his focus on patterns of behavior. He
believes that these patterns are built in the foundation of character and that they help to define
the qualities that an individual possesses that demonstrate their psychological resources and
limitations (Renshon 2004). Renshon conceives of one’s character as the foundation of their
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psychology, and that the patterns of behavior are the visible and public demonstration of their
psychology (Renshon 2004). The identification of patterns through specific character elements
provides much more depth than a classic typology, however elements from both Barber’s theory
and Renshon’s theory are extremely valuable in conceiving of the importance of character in the
executive office.
Fred Greenstein also applies his own theory in looking at the Clinton presidency, which
provides for an interesting comparison of Renshon’s application. He looks at Clinton using each
of his six character elements that impact presidential performance. In regards to his effectiveness
as a public communicator, Clinton could either be outstanding or unfocused and off-topic,
however he usually had a strong ability to captivate an audience (Greenstein 2009, 185).
Clinton’s organizational capacity was very low. He gave too much freedom to his aides and
advisors and there was no structure to his organizational strategy (Greenstein 2009). Clinton
showed a high level of political skill in that devoted his life to politics, but he was also quite
susceptible to change his policies and to overreach when he believed political conditions were
favorable (Greenstein 2009). Regarding his political vision, Clinton’s vision was never clearly
defined. He was perhaps too open to modification and took the middle ground on many issues so
that a clear policy vision was never showcased (Greenstein 2009, 187). Clinton’s intelligence
was impressive throughout his early life and his presidency, showcasing a high cognitive style
(Greenstein 2009). Finally Clinton’s emotional intelligence was lacking. He was extremely
politically gifted, shown through his thwarting of the Republican party’s efforts to remove him
from office, but his experience as president shows that the absence of emotional soundness
created great obstacles in him being able to exercise his full political potential (Greenstein 2009).
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Seen through both Greenstein and Renshon’s theories, it is clear that Clinton possessed
extreme political ability and intelligence, but that he struggled with emotional intelligence and
his need to be validated. Both applications provide similar conceptions of the performance of
Clinton as a president, although the character elements that they develop and utilize are different.
With the addition of Renshon’s psychological patterns, his theory provides more depth, as it
looks at both psychology and leadership/character elements to give the fullest picture of an
individual as president. Renshon writes, “Unlike a person’s attitudes or personality traits,
character, if it has any useful substantive meaning, reflects a person’s basic and habitual ways of
relating to circumstance. So to the extent that a person’s character has become psychologically
consolidated, we can expect a certain degree of behavioral consistency” (Renshon 2000, 54).
The element of consistency is extremely important because it allows for the theory to confidently
predict how any individual will act while in office. In this sense, Renshon sees the usefulness of
Barber’s attempt to use character typology as a predictive theory, a fact that many of Barber’s
critics fail to recognize or acknowledge. Renshon wants his theory to be predictive and he states
that typologies of leaders have been useful in pointing to broad areas of temptations or
tendencies for presidents who are able to fit into a specific category, however clearly there are
limitations to what typologies can provide (Renshon 2000). It is possible for presidents to drift
and to overcome psychological impulses or tendencies and this complexity makes using a
typology risky, but not impossible (Renshon 2000). The depth and the complexity of Renshon’s
theory on presidential character is highly valuable and the consistency that he believes that it can
provide in predicting presidential behavior allows for his theory to be utilized more confidently
in conceiving of the role that character plays in presidential decision-making.
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Strategic Action Literature
In Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, Richard Neustadt focuses on the way
that a president uses the resources and the situational elements around him to gain power. He
writes that one should not measure a president as if they are the entire government, but they
should be measured by their strengths and weaknesses concerning their capacity to influence the
conduct of the people who constitute the government around him (Neustadt 1990). He
emphasizes that, “To rate a President according to these rules, one looks into them man’s own
capabilities as seeker and wielder of effective influence upon the other men involved in
governing the country” (1990, 4). Words from former president Dwight D. Eisenhower frame the
main problem that Neustadt tackles in his book, which is that “powers” are no guarantee of
having power and that clerkship, the successful balancing of different interests, is no guarantee
of leadership (Neustadt 1990, 10). Eisenhower said that, “I sit here all day trying to persuade
people to do the things they ought to have sense enough to do without my persuading them . . .
That’s all the powers of the President amount to” (Neustadt 1990, 10). Neustadt emphasizes
three distinctive elements that a president must possess in order to succeed in his role and to gain
power: the power to persuade, a strong professional reputation, and a high level of public
prestige. He uses three cases in which he believes that these three elements are strongly
demonstrated. The first case is the removal of Douglas MacArthur as commander of American
forces in the Far East in 1951. The second is Truman’s seizure of the steel mills in 1952. And the
third case is Eisenhower’s executive order in 1957 to send federal troops in Little Rock,
Arkansas to allow for racial integration in public schools.
The common denominator among these three cases is that the president’s executive order
brought results in the form of direct action because they were self-executing (Neustadt 1990).
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There are five common factors that were present in each of the cases; both the president’s
involvement and his words were unambiguous, his order was widely publicized, the people who
had to carry it out had everything they needed, and these people also had no doubt of his
authority to issue it to them (Neustadt 1990, 18). While all three of the cases demonstrate these
five factors, it is quite rare that this entire combination occurs and that presidential orders are
carried out with such ease (Neustadt 1990). These cases also are all last resort decisions; ones
that Truman and Eisenhower did not necessarily want to make, but they felt as if they were left
with no other option (Neustadt 1990). Emphasized by Neustadt is the importance of considering
the cost of decision making. These types of last resort decisions that Truman and Eisenhower
made are very costly, as drastic and such direct action rarely comes at a low cost (Neustadt
1990). The persuasive process that presidents must employ in order to have power and authority
is still demonstrated through these cases, however it is important to recognize that commands are
only one method of persuasion and they are not a method that is suitable for the majority of
decisions that presidents will make. Neustadt emphasizes that through the method of bargaining,
and not commanding, a president avoids high cost decisions and is able to gain more power and
influence through the three main elements of the power to persuade, professional reputation, and
public prestige.
Neustadt’s first element, the one that he seems to place the most importance on, is the
power to persuade. He opens up the discussion emphasizing that what the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 aimed to create was a government of separate powers, but in actuality it
created a government of “separated institutions sharing powers” (Neustadt 1990, 29). This
separateness of the institutions combined with the sharing of authority between the president and
political parties sets the scene for situations in which a president has the need to employ
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persuasion (Neustadt 1990). A president’s main persuasive task is, “to convince such men that
what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for their sake on their authority”
(Neustadt 1990, 30). The best way for a president to do this is to convince those around that his
aims are dependent upon their help (Sperlich 1969, 407). It is important to note that persuasive
power is not simply possessing the individual characteristics of charm or strong argumentation
skills, but that the derivation of power comes from one’s status and authority (Neustadt 1990).
This type of power gives a president great advantage over others, and his relationships with those
around him strongly influence his persuasive abilities. Essentially, Neustadt argues that
persuasive power gives the president the power to bargain, and that his status and authority yield
bargaining advantages (Neustadt 1990). Self-interest is at the heart of the notion that presidential
power is the power to persuade. An Eisenhower aide summed it up well saying, “The people on
the Hill don’t do what they might like to do, they do what they think they have to do in their own
interest as they see it” (Neustadt 1990, 39). In dealing with representatives, senators, and aides, a
president’s task is to convince them in believing that what he wants of them is what they want of
themselves and what is in their best interest (Neustadt 1990).
A president’s success in persuading others is no guarantee, so Neustadt emphasizes that
a president can maximize his effectiveness by guarding his power prospects in the course of
making choices (Neustadt 1990). To guard his power prospects, a president has to first
understand the nature of his power (Sperlich 1969). He must be able to be his own “power
expert” and see the possible power implications inherent in his decisions (Sperlich 1969). In
order to do this a president needs meaningful information, which comes mostly through trusted
advisors, but also through a president’s own initiative in finding out the range of facts and
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opinions that he can get on a particular issue, therefore he must be an active participant in the
details of his political work (Sperlich 1969).
The second element a successful president should possess is a strong professional
reputation. Those individuals whose opinions make up a president’s professional reputation are
members of the “Washington community” (Neustadt 1990). These include his administration,
governors of states, members of Congress, military commanders, leading politicians in all
parties, representatives of private organizations, individuals in the media and news, and foreign
diplomats (Neustadt 1990). These sectors of individuals need the president just as much as the
president needs them, leading to what is called the “law of anticipated reactions”. This means,
“The individuals who share in governing do what they think they must. A President’s effect on
them is heightened or diminished by their thoughts about his probable reaction to their doing.
They base their expectations on what they can see of him. And they are watching him all the
time” (Neustadt 1990, 51). A president largely builds his reputation by rewarding his friends and
punishing his enemies. A president’s professional reputation is not static and not every
Washingtonian will share the same view and opinion of him, however there is usually a
dominant tone regarding the appraisals of a president (Neustadt 1990, 53). Reputation is both
established and altered by the president himself, and he has the opportunity to change his
reputation if he feels that he is not being professionally respected and trusted (Neustadt 1990).
The quality of a president’s reputation has a significant impact on his ability in achieving
favorable bargains and the security of guarding his power prospects (Sperlich 1969). Having a
strong and positive reputation makes it much easier for presidents to work with, and persuade,
those around them. Individuals who do not have a favorable view of the president can be
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extremely difficult for presidents to work with, thus impeding the ability for a president to
achieve want they want.
The third and final element that Neustadt outlines is public prestige, which is how the
outside public (separate from the Washington community) views the president (Neustadt 1990).
Similar to professional reputation, public prestige is a matter of opinion and judgment. The law
of anticipated reaction still applies, one only need to swap in the public in place of those in the
Washington community. The public is a much broader and diverse group than the
Washingtonians, and their impressions are generally more imprecise regarding the president,
thus, a high public prestige is oftentimes more challenging to achieve (Neustadt 1990, 73).
Public prestige and professional reputation are strongly connected. The public’s view of the
president is a strong influence on his professional reputation. If those in the Washington
community think that a president’s public prestige is high, his professional reputation is likely to
be stronger (Neustadt 1990). Favorable impressions of the president yields him greater
persuasive power among those in the Washington community, which allows him to more
actively pursue and enact policies that he desires to implement and the less likely that
Washingtonians will resist his aims (Sperlich 1969).
The satisfactions and the frustrations that the public feels regarding the president’s
performance have a significant impact on public prestige. However, there are numerous factors
that a president cannot control that oftentimes frustrate the public that pose a serious threat to his
public prestige (Hargrove 2001). A president must prepare the public for these frustrations in
case they occur. Neustadt writes that, “If he can make them think the hardship necessary, and can
make them want to hear it with good grace, his prestige may not suffer when they feel it”
(Neustadt 1990, 84). In order to do this, a president must teach reality. The way he teaches
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reality is through making the right choices and actions. Teaching reality relies upon, “the
politician’s faculty of discernment in the effort to articulate plausible remedies for emerging
policy problems that will win general political support (Hargrove 1998, 43). He must inform the
public that he oftentimes faces constraints that he cannot overcome, but that he does the best
with the resources and the information that he has.
One critique of Neustadt’s theory is provided within Hargrove’s article on Presidential
Power by scholar Peter Sperlich. Sperlich emphasizes that Neustadt’s model of leadership is
logically consistent, however he asks the question of, “Is persuasion, through bargaining, the
only or best path to influence or are there other bases to persuasion as well?” (Hargrove 2001,
246). Persuasive resources should not solely rely on “instrumental appeals”, as many presidents
are able to be persuasive without the use of power and command, but should instead rely on
restructuring institutional roles and creating cooperative teams (Hargrove 2001). Sperlich also
believes, as do many critics of Neustadt, that no president is able to adequately calculate the
political resources that he has and achieve what he wants all through bargaining. In fact, Sperlich
believes that quest for the type of power that Neustadt outlines would lead to “overload and
breakdown” (Hargrove 2001, 246). He believes instead that Neustadt’s prescriptions should be
more balanced by a wider array of leadership skills.
A second critic of Neustadt, James MacGregor Burns, believes that Neustadt only
considers half of the possibilities of leadership potential. Burns conceives of transactional leaders
and transformational leaders. According to Burns, Neustadt only considers transactional leaders,
which are exemplified by presidents who bargain and “exchange favors in a situation of political
stability in which fundamental questions about policy or the polity are not asked” (Hargrove
2001, 248). A transformational leader is one who can “articulate and reinterpret the historical
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situation according to widely shared values about the moral purposes of the polity” (Hargrove
1998, 30). All that Neustadt has described within his book is a transactional president, which
MacGregor Burns believes leads to endless bargaining, power hoarding, and the management of
manipulation (Hargrove 2001). The shortcoming of MacGregor Burns’ critique is that he is not
fully explicit whether a president can have elements of both types of leaderships. For example,
Abraham Lincoln, according to Hargrove, was a brilliant transformational leader, but he also was
clever in the transactional sense, and this led him to be extremely successful in the attainment of
power (Hargrove 1998, 31). Hargrove makes it clear that transformational leaders must possess
some transactional abilities, but not all transactional leaders must be transformational leaders
(Hargrove 2001, 249).
Neustadt does not take into account the historical context in which presidents find
themselves, as he only looks at midcentury presidents. This is only one small piece of time, one
in which it is well matched that a president must bargain and use his political resources wisely
(Hargrove 2001, 251). Scholar Stephen Skowronek views the presidents that Neustadt examines
as presidents only having to face how to make a static presidency work, not how to change and
reconstruct the system of politics based upon when they are president. Also presidents in
different historical periods may act very differently and Neustadt’s theory does not allow for that
adaptation (Hargrove 2001). Skowronek broadens Neustadt’s idea of bargaining to include two
virtues that he believes must be included in order for presidents to be effective. First is that
presidents, “must have a perception of their place in the succession of presidencies” and second
is “an ability to articulate a political agenda appropriate to their place in the succession”
(Hargrove 2001, 251). Skowronek gives a valuable critique of Neustadt, as he gives a much
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broader view of the political limits and possibilities and he emphasizes that skills and strategies
of leadership must be matched to the time in which a president is a leader (Hargrove 2001).
In terms of the impact of the institution of the executive office and how the president
works with others, scholar Matthew Kerbel measures individuality, the institution, and historical
context in relation to success and failure. Kerbel found that organizational efficiency, meaning a
politically savvy staff, is crucial to presidential success (Hargrove 2001, 257). Personal traits
such as charm and charisma are not as important, but persuasion and bargaining skills do matter,
especially when carrots (rewards) are offered over sticks (threats) (Hargrove 2001). He also
found that high public prestige and presidential achievement are not necessarily related
(Hargrove 2001). These central critiques target Neustadt’s theory in three main areas: the
conception of political resources, the importance of the individual presidential within history,
and the institution of the presidency. However despite these critiques, Neustadt’s theory on
persuasion and bargaining in a useful model in which to better analyze the success or failure of
particular presidential decisions.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY AND METHODS
Character Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework that I will be employing regarding presidential character will
contain a combination of different elements from the various theories that were discussed in the
literature review. It will primarily focus on the elements of Stanley Renshon’s character theory,
but I will be using elements from Fred Greenstein’s theory as well. Through analyzing these
theories on presidential character, I have developed a set of character elements that I believe are
crucial to successful presidential decision-making. While presidents do not necessarily have to
strongly demonstrate all four elements of character in order to be successful decision-makers, the
presence of these elements within a president’s behavior in making decisions can provide
rationales for successful decisions. In examining the impact that character can play in
presidential decision-making, these are the key variables that I believe will offer the most useful
way of conceiving of presidential character and decision-making. The theory is as follows:

Character:
Ambition, integrity,
relatedness, and emotional
intelligence (self-esteem)

Good judgment and strong
political leadership

Successful decisions

My research question seeks to understand if the presence of certain characterological
elements can help to explain the success or failure of presidential decisions. I hypothesize that
the possession of a set of strong character elements will make successful decision-making more
likely. I believe that my independent variables, the character elements that I have chosen, namely
ambition, integrity, relatedness, and emotional intelligence, will be determinants in shaping good
judgment and political leadership which will influence a president’s demonstration of political

32
leadership and judgment and determine whether a decision will likely be successful or
unsuccessful. Regarding the literature on character theory, James David Barber is the
foundational scholar. His theory has its strengths and weaknesses, but for the purpose of my
research, his typology scheme is not as useful. I agree with Alexander George’s critique that
Barber’s theory is too simplistic with its four pure character types of active-positive, activenegative, passive-positive, and passive-negative (George 1974, 274). Each of the types that he
develops is presented as a cluster of characteristics, but there is no empirical or theoretical basis
for them, and he does not adequately take into account situational factors (George 1974, 251).
Fred Greenstein’s list of character elements is more useful, especially the element of emotional
intelligence, but his “theory” is simply a list of elements, not an integrated and developed
political theory, and so it cannot be used on its own. Stanley Renshon’s theory is perhaps the
most complex of the theories reviewed, as the elements that he employs are concrete and well
developed and I believe that they can be used as central elements the can help explain the
success of presidential decisions. The elements of ambition, integrity, and relatedness are
employed in a broad, yet focused way that does not attempt to categorize presidents. Also these
elements lead to good judgment and political leadership, which I believe are very important
determinants for successful decision-making and neither Barber nor Greenstein includes these
two elements within their frameworks. This is why I will be principally using Renshon’s theory
on presidential character for my model on presidential decision-making.
To briefly revisit the meanings of each of the character elements, ambition is “a
president’s level of desire to achieve his purposes, and the skills he is able to bring to bear on
accomplishing them” (Renshon 2000, 44). Ambition encompasses the motivational element that
individuals possess and the set of skills that they have that can be successfully engaged in the
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pursuit and accomplishment of their goals (Renshon 1996, 186). Renshon very briefly considers
self-esteem regarding ambition, however he does not go into sufficient detail to understand how
self-esteem has an impact within his theoretical framework. That is why I have included the
element of emotional intelligence, which comes from Fred Greenstein’s list of character
elements. Emotional intelligence is how a president manages his emotions, whether he uses them
as a motivator or whether he allows them to undermine his performance (Greenstein 2000, 6). I
believe that self-esteem is inherently connected to emotional intelligence, as a low self-esteem
will likely lead to low emotional intelligence and vice versa. Self-esteem is very difficult to
measure, whereas emotional intelligence can be more easily defined and measured, so that it why
I am choosing to add the element of emotional intelligence within the model. Self-esteem is also
highly related to ambition, as Renshon also discusses that ambition can be problematic in that if
one has high ambition and is driven by a low sense of self-esteem in amassing power, ambition is
not always a good quality to have (Renshon 1996). Emotional intelligence provides a remedy for
understanding the bad vs. good ambition, something that Renshon does not go into enough detail
in within his theoretical framework.
Integrity, what Renshon refers to as character integrity, “refers to the ideals and values by
which the candidate says he lives and his fidelity to them” (Renshon 2000, 44). This
encompasses both how others view the way that he possesses a set of genuine beliefs and sticks
to them, but it also includes a president’s interior psychology in how he views himself and how
he feels that he has acted according to his beliefs (Renshon 2000; Renshon 1996). Here again we
see a subtle mention of self-esteem, another reason why I have included it within the element of
emotional intelligence in my framework. Finally relatedness “refers to the basic nature of the
candidate’s interpersonal relations, his stance toward others” (Renshon 2000, 44). A president’s
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relationships with others form his relational sphere, and within the sphere there is a wide range
of different groups (Renshon 1996, 192). This sphere includes the antagonistic and hostile
relationships and the extremely intimate relationships (Renshon 1996, 192). While a president
may have antagonistic relationships in his sphere, relatedness is an inherently positive
characteristic and the better a president’s interpersonal relationships, the stronger his relatedness
is towards others. In order for presidential decisions to be successful, these elements must be
demonstrated within an individual president’s character.
The demonstrated presence of these character elements should then lead to good
judgment and strong political leadership, also elements taken from Renshon’s theory. The
element of judgment is one of the most important elements, and one that other political scholars
did not take enough into account. Presidential judgment is essentially a president’s ability to
match solutions to circumstances, in that he can identify a problem, see it for what it is, and
devise an appropriate solution (Renshon 2004). According to Renshon, the resources that a
president has at his disposal will not matter if he cannot make good judgments. He must be able
to analyze, reflect upon, and make decisions based upon these analytic and reflective abilities
(Renshon 1996). Renshon writes that, “I argue that substantially developed character capacities
are instrumental, if not necessary, correlates to good judgment. However it is clear that good
judgment is a necessary but insufficient element in presidential performance” (Renshon 1996,
223). That is why Renshon adds the element of political leadership, as good judgment is not
sufficient in determining whether a decision is successful or not. There are three distinctive aims
of political leadership: mobilization, orchestration, and consolidation (Renshon 2004). A good
political leader must be able to translate his judgments and turn them into effective policies
(Renshon 1996). It is imperative that presidents have the elements of ambition, relatedness,
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integrity, and emotional intelligence in order for him to demonstrate good judgment and strong
political leadership. These are the variables that will lead to successful decision-making.

Strategic Action Theoretical Framework
Compared to the character theoretical framework, the strategic action framework used
here is simpler in that it comes primarily from a single scholar, Richard Neustadt. Looking back
to my research question, I also seek to understand whether the use of strategic resources, through
persuasion and bargaining, can lead to the relative success or failure of presidential decisions.
Richard Neustadt’s theory is the most well known of theories regarding a president’s use of his
strategic resources. My version of the theoretical framework is as follows:

Vantage
Points
Individual
Sense of
Power

Strong reputation, and
high public prestige

Political
Power
(Ability to
persuade)

Successful
Decisions

My hypothesis is that a president’s ability to persuade and bargain strategically using the
political resources available to him will make successful decisions more likely. My independent
variables of vantage points and an individual’s sense of power are the determinants of a strong
reputation and high public prestige, two of the core elements of Neustadt’s theory. Each one is
essential to a president’s attainment of political power, which Neustadt defines as the
ability/power to persuade, the third core element of Neustadt’s theory (Neustadt 1990, 11).
To briefly define each of the terms, vantage points are simply the bargaining advantages
that the president has through the formal presidential powers that are enumerated within the
Constitution, including the veto power and power of appointments (Neustadt 1990, 31). Vantage
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points also include the status that the president has that no other individual possesses. Individual
sense of power is simply an individual’s recognition that maintaining his/her own personal
power is essential for successfully carrying out the duties of the presidency (Neustadt 1990, 144).
These two factors then enable a president to acquire a strong professional reputation and high
public prestige. A president’s professional reputation consists of the opinions of the individuals
that make up the “Washington community” (Neustadt 1990). It is essential that a president have
a strong reputation because this makes it much easier for him to work with and persuade those
around him, thus helping him achieve greater political power. The way he establishes a strong
reputation is by using his vantage points to reward his friends and punish his enemies so that
those around him view him as powerful. The final element is public prestige, which is how the
outside public views the president (Neustadt 1990, 73). In the quest for public prestige, the
president must teach the public reality. He must convey to the public that there are limits to what
he can do, but he must also reassure them that he will do everything he can with the resources
that he has. High public prestige correlates with a strong reputation, because a favorable
impression of the president by the public yields him greater persuasive power among those in the
Washington community, which allows him to achieve his political aims and gain political power.
These elements then lead to the ability to persuade, which consists of the president’s skill
in convincing those around him, advisors and politicians, that his aims are dependent on their
help and support and their aims are dependent on the president’s assistance (Neustadt 1990, 30).
Neustadt argues that persuasive power gives the president the power to bargain, meaning the
ability to convince others that what he wants of them is what their responsibilities and own selfinterest require of them (Neustadt 1990, 40). His status and authority yield bargaining
advantages, which are vantage points that a president recognizes that he has at his disposal,
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making persuasive power more than just simple charm. These advantages help in securing
political power (Neustadt 1990, 32). The combination of these three elements leads to a president
achieving a large amount of political power and successful decisions are much more likely if a
president possesses substantial political power.
Methods
To gain a better understanding of how these two political frameworks can provide
explanations for successful presidential decision-making, I will principally be utilizing a
comparative case study method approach. Case studies allow for a process-oriented
investigation, which is the best way in which to conceive of presidential decision-making. They
also aim to illuminate a specific case and use that case to suggest broader understandings or
generalizations that can be taken from a particular case study (Lipson, 2005). A small-N design
will permit me to examine my case in depth, and allow for exploratory and descriptive results
that will hopefully provide a contribution to the field (Johnson and Reynolds, 2012).
The president that I will be examining within these theoretical frameworks is Abraham
Lincoln. I believe that it is useful to try and examine and better understand one of our nation’s
greatest presidents through several of his key decisions. Lincoln was president during a very
unique time in our country’s history, as no other president has served during a civil war, so this
provides an additional interesting element of his presidency to consider. Many of the decisions
that Lincoln made were highly controversial and they had significant impacts and grand
implications for the future of the Union. While Lincoln is not a modern president, his
significance in history is unquestionable and he is arguably the most written about and studied
president, so there are a vast amount of resources to study and utilize surrounding both him and
his presidency.
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I will be using multiple cases that I believe will provide variation and allow for more
useful conclusions to be made. There are three cases, i.e. decisions, that I will be examining, one
a success, one a failure, and one with mixed results. The first case that I will be using is
Lincoln’s successful decision to issue Emancipation Proclamation, which took effect in January
of 1863, and essentially freed all slaves within Confederate territory. This decision represented a
large shift in the war objectives of the Union and the issuing of the proclamation severely
diminished the military power that the Confederates possessed, as many freed slaves chose to
join the Union Army following their emancipation, giving the Union a strong strategic
advantage. The second case that I have chosen is Lincoln’s failed management of General
George McClellan. Until Lincoln selected General Grant to lead the Union army in 1864, he had
a series of problems with insubordinate generals, especially General George McClellan. The
Union suffered several significant losses due to the disobedience and incompetence of General
McClellan, putting the future of the Union in jeopardy. The final case is Lincoln’s suspension of
habeas corpus in 1861, which some would view as a successful decision and some would see as
a failure. Lincoln asserted extraordinary innumerable executive powers to allow for the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in order to protect the capital from riots and potential
attacks. Some see this as a legitimate use of war powers, while others see it as a huge violation of
civil liberties. I have selected these three cases specifically because I feel that they represent
several different, yet equally important, aspects of Lincoln’s presidency, as well as each of them
are relatively well-known and highly studied decisions so there are sufficient resources about
each case.
As a principal source of information, I will be using archival sources and Lincoln
biographies. Because Lincoln was president 150 years ago, much of the information that scholars
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and historians have about him comes from letters, statements, and other primary documents
written both by him and about him, so I will be using many of these types of documents within
my research. I will also be gathering information from several contemporary biographies written
about him, as well as using newspaper, magazine articles, and biographies/memoirs written
during his lifetime. Some of the information that I will be utilizing comes from the Abraham
Lincoln Presidential Library, located in Springfield, Illinois, which houses the largest database of
documents about him and his presidency.
Operationalizing the Character Theoretical Framework
As viewed above, I have developed two different theoretical frameworks using existing
theories from several notable political scholars, one focusing on character and the other on the
strategic use of political resources. It is important to define my variables for each of these
frameworks, so that I can identify the presence of them within the three cases that I have
selected. Starting with my character theoretical framework, my independent variable includes the
character elements of ambition, integrity, relatedness, and emotional intelligence. In looking at
ambition, one should look for whether a president initiates policies that are incremental or
transformational (Renshon 2004, 56). Does a president simply build upon predecessors’ policy
frameworks or does he use his political position to transform them? An ambitious president will
seek to achieve his purposes through transformation of policy. The types of skills that they will
possess in order to achieve their purposes encompass both physical and motivational skills.
Physically, an ambitious president will be highly active and engaged. Motivationally, an
ambitious president will demonstrate strong inner drive and initiative. An ambitious president
will also be identified through his desire to leave a historical legacy and be remembered for
generations to come.
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Next, integrity will be identified through a president’s demonstration of a developed and
consolidated identity. A president that possesses strong integrity will publicly express their
values and ideas and stick to them when making decisions. A president that is willing to take
personal and political risks sticking to their values showcases strong integrity through the
courage of their convictions (Renshon 2004, 61). Included in integrity is a president’s
willingness to put his convictions to the ultimate test: the test of loss (Renshon 2004, 61). If a
president is able to stick to his convictions despite potential losses and accept responsibility if
things don’t go the way they should, that signifies strong integrity.
Relatedness can be operationalized through the quality of relationships that a president
has with those around them. Within their sphere of relationships, do they surround themselves
with people that they can trust and have honest and meaningful dialogue with? Are they
inclusive and comfortable with a wide variety of people or do they often exclude others and only
have a small circle of trusted advisors? Also included within relatedness is the way they a
president treats his staff, advisers, and appointees (Renshon 1996, 96). Finally within the
independent variable of character there is the element of emotional intelligence. Strong
emotional intelligence is demonstrated when a president in is control of his emotions. While
there may be hardships or problems within his personal or political life, a president does not let
negative feelings of grief, anger, sadness, frustration, or despair affect the way that he does his
job, remaining both calm and focused even when under pressure.
These four character elements then shape the level of judgment and political leadership
that a president possesses. Good judgment can be operationalized through a president seeing a
problem with clear eyes, not through wishful thinking (Renshon 2004, 109). He sees a problem
as it is, not how he wants it to be. A president who employs good judgment will also be watchful,
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meaning that he will be curious and seek information regarding how to deal with any problems
or decisions that they may face. Finally they will be realistic risk assessors in that they can weigh
different outcomes of their potential decisions and decide based upon the possible intended
outcomes. A president will also demonstrate the three aims of political leadership- mobilization,
orchestration, and consolidation- through their ability to organize and educate the public about
their policy views and political vision. They will also demonstrate charisma and finesse in
discussing any problems with their advisors and in informing the public. A president
demonstrating strong political leadership will also be able to use his political skills in the
strengthening of his political relationships, both with the public and within their circles of
political advisors.
My dependent variable is successful decisions. Successful decisions depend upon the
presence of the character elements of ambition, integrity, relatedness, and emotional intelligence,
which then leads to good judgment and strong political leadership. Successful decisions will be
decisions that are supported and well received by the public and by the political community.
Successful decisions may still be controversial, but they will be significant and will implement
changes that are in line with the policy vision of the president.
Operationalizing the Strategic Action Theoretical Framework
Moving on to the theoretical framework of strategic action, I will first operationalize the
independent variables of vantage points and an individual sense of power. For vantage points,
one must look to how a president uses the powers that are built into the Constitution. Does he
utilize the full array of presidential powers that he has? Does he bargain using the vantage points
of veto power, appointments, command of the army and navy, etc.? For the independent variable
of an individual’s sense of power, this will be seen in how a president views how necessary
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power is in achieving their aims. A president must view power as essential in order for to them
to make successful decisions. They will strive to achieve sufficient amounts of power, as they
will have both an intrinsic and indispensible need for power to achieve their purposes.
The next variable, strong reputation, can be operationalized by viewing how political
advisers around the president believe how politically astute the president is. In order to have a
strong reputation, those around him must believe the president is politically astute and adept in
utilizing their presidential powers. They may not view the president favorably or agree with all
of their decisions, but they will respect the way in which they uses their political power to make
decisions. Public prestige will be operationalized in how those within the Washington
community believe how favorable the public is of the president. Both strong reputation and
public prestige can be identified through letters or statements made by those around the president
regarding how they believe how politically astute they are and how they believe the larger public
views the president. A president that attains political power will demonstrate control and
authority dealing with each specific decision that they face. They are able to persuade those
around them using the bargaining advantages that they have and they will have the ability to
convince others to act in ways compatible with the president’s policy needs.
My dependent variable, like in the theoretical framework regarding character, is
successful decisions. Successful decisions depend upon the presence of the vantage points and an
individual’s sense of power. These then determine a president’s professional reputation and
public prestige, which lead to a president obtaining political power (the ability to persuade).
Previously stated, successful decisions will be decisions that are supported and well received by
the public and the political community. While they may still be controversial, they will also be
significant and will implement changes that are in line with the policy vision of the president.
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CHAPTER 4: LINCOLN BIOGRAPHY
The intricate personality of Abraham Lincoln is both fascinating and complex. Even one
hundred and fifty years following his death, historians and scholars continue to try and better
understand the character of one of our most revered presidents. Lincoln biographer Ronald C.
White summarizes the challenge that understanding Lincoln represents, writing that, “Lincoln
continues to fascinate us because he eludes simple definitions and final judgments” (White 2009,
3). Lincoln has written very few words about himself, only writing a few short autobiographies
in 1858 and 1860 for his election campaigns, which makes the goal of understanding him that
much more difficult, however, numerous scholars and historians have attempted to fill this void
and have published detailed biographies of Lincoln’s life. A brief summary of these works
examining Lincoln’s life pre-presidency can help to better make sense of his character and
personality and how he became the individual that he is remembered as today.
Abraham Lincoln was born to Thomas and Nancy Lincoln on February 12, 1809 in a
small log cabin in Hardin County, Kentucky (White 2009). Throughout Abe’s early childhood,
the Lincolns moved several times to different farmsteads in Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois,
failing to live prosperous lives due to both isolation from any major markets and Thomas
Lincoln’s lack of ability to farm enough land to support his family (Goodwin 2005, 47). When
Lincoln was nine years old, Nancy Lincoln died from what was called “milk sickness”, and his
father later remarried Sarah Bush Johnston, who adopted Abraham as her own son and who
Abraham came to care for very dearly (Goodwin 2005). His relationship with his father, Thomas,
was quite the opposite of the relationship he had with his mother and stepmother, as Abe never
had any favorable words or memories of his father and he distanced himself from him at an early
age (Donald 1995, 32). Later in Lincoln’s life when asked about his family and childhood, he
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answered that it could all be condensed into a single sentence, “The short and simple annals of
the poor” (Goodwin 2005, 47). Lincoln didn’t see his family history and ancestry as particularly
important or significant, and he believed his origins to be from “undistinguished families”
(Donald 1995, 19). Despite the hardships of poverty, death, and the constant relocation of his
family, Lincoln came to find solace in books and in his imagination in satisfying his intellectual
drive (White 2009). Lincoln believed that his own education was something that he had to pick
up on his own, as the local school did little to foster his inquisitive spirit. Books became his
academy and he read everything that he could get his hands on (Goodwin 2005, 51).
At the age of 22, Lincoln left his family home and set off for New Salem, Illinois, where
he would live for the next six years, until 1837. He worked a number of jobs, including as a
flatboatman, clerk, merchant, postmaster, and surveyor (Goodwin 2005). He also served as a
captain in 1832 during the Blackhawk War, unanimously voted captain by the militia volunteers,
as he was an individual who quickly won loyalty and respect from those around him (White
2009, 50). Within the town of New Salem, many grew fond of the hardworking and helpful
Lincoln, and he quickly established strong relationships with the other men in town (Donald
1995). One of Lincoln’s most significant decisions in his early life was in March of 1832, when
he made his first move into the political world, running for the state legislature after
encouragement from friends in New Salem (White 2009). He lost the election, however he felt
heartened by the fact that he received 277 out of 300 votes from New Salem. This inspired
Lincoln to persist in growing his political base and in broadening his support outside of
Sangamon county (White 2009, 53). When he ran for a state legislature seat two years later in
1834, he won easily due to his extended network of support. This victory was the first of four
successive terms that he would hold in the Illinois state legislature (in 1836, 1838, and 1840) and
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it marked his first foray into the political world that he would be involved in for the remainder of
his life (Goodwin 2005).
Lincoln began to study law following his victory in the 1834 election and he received his
license as a lawyer in the spring of 1837. He then moved to Springfield, where he would begin
his career with prominent Springfield lawyer John Todd Stuart at the Hoffman Row office
(White 2009). Just as in New Salem, Lincoln made friends easily in Springfield, conversing with
other men late into the night in an informal literary and debate society, discussing politics,
religion, and literature (Donald 1995, 70). Politically, Lincoln continued to gain influence and
support, becoming the leader of the Whig Party in the state legislature, and becoming wellknown throughout central Illinois for his speeches supporting William Henry Harrison for
president in the 1840 election (Donald 1995).
On November 4, 1842, when Lincoln was thirty-three years old, he married Mary Todd, a
wealthy woman with Kentucky origins, after a tumultuous courtship and multiple engagements
(White 2009). Lincoln’s marriage to Mary started a new era in his life, both in starting a family
and in continuing to grow his political and legal career. They had their first child, Robert Todd
Lincoln, in August of 1843 and in the fall of 1844 he began his law partnership with William
Herndon (Donald 1995). In August of 1846, Lincoln, still a member of the Whig Party, won his
biggest political seat yet, being voted the representative for the Seventh District of Illinois in the
U.S. House of Representatives, setting him on the road to the nation’s capitol (White 2009, 135).
Within the House, Lincoln was able to win the respect and trust of others, relationships that
would prove essential in his future rise to power. Following his two-year term as a
representative, Lincoln felt that he was “losing interest in politics” (Goodwin 2005, 130).
Returning to Springfield in 1849, Lincoln would spend about the next six years dedicated to his
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law career. He faced terrible sadness during these years, as his second son Eddie Lincoln, who
was born in 1846, died of tuberculosis in the winter of 1850, but also joy, as Mary would have
two more sons, William Lincoln, in December of 1850, and Thomas Lincoln, in the spring of
1853 (White 2005, 181).
The year 1854 marked a new beginning to the political career of Abraham Lincoln, as his
desire to achieve high political office was reawakened with the passage of the pro-slavery
Kansas-Nebraska Act (Goodwin 2005). He began to make public speeches denouncing slavery
and the Kansas-Nebraska Act and opposing the extension of slavery to new territories within the
United States. Also during this time, Lincoln was instrumental in the formation of the new
Republican Party. He played a vital role in the 1856 elections, helping Republicans to win a
majority in the Illinois legislature and he became a prominent leader of the party (White 2009,
230). Following these elections, Lincoln himself reentered the political world, running for the
U.S. Senate in the 1858 elections against Democrat Stephen Douglas (Goodwin 2005). Lincoln’s
House Divided Speech at the Republican nomination in Springfield in 1858 garnered major
support for Lincoln and the Republican Party. He stated, “A house divided itself cannot stand. I
believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the
Union to be dissolved- I do not expect the house to fall- but I do expect it will cease to be
divided” (Donald 1995, 206). Following this speech, the campaign between Lincoln and Douglas
was fierce, especially with the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates, an extended series of seven
debates within different cities in Illinois (White 2009). Despite Lincoln’s strong charisma and
widespread support, he lost the election 54 to 46, and while disappointed, he accepted his defeat
graciously and without protest (Donald 1995, 228).
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Knowledge of the politician Abraham Lincoln spread throughout the country following
the Lincoln-Douglas debates. With the positive reception that both the debates and his continued
political speeches had received in Iowa, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Kansas, the idea of Lincoln
running for president became quite plausible as his network of political support expanded
beyond Illinois (Donald 1995, 235). One of the most important events leading up to Lincoln’s
nomination and election was his speech at Cooper Union in New York City in February of 1860,
which some scholars regard as the reason why Lincoln became president. The speech propelled
him onto the national scene, and made him stand out as a serious candidate for the Republican
nomination. The speech was extremely well received by his audience and was published in
several major New York newspapers for everyone to read (White 2009, 314). Lincoln famously
ended his speech with the words, “Let us have faith that right makes might, and in that faith, let
us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it” (White 2009, 313).
Lincoln himself remained cautiously optimistic about his political future and whenever
he was asked about the upcoming presidential election he carefully guarded his ambitions and
would speak enthusiastically of other candidates (Goodwin 2005, 211). Only two and a half
weeks before the Republican Party nominating convention did Lincoln slightly reveal his desire
to receive the nomination, stating that, “The taste is in my mouth, a little” (White 2009, 318).
Lincoln’s main opponents in the nomination for the presidency were William Seward, Edward
Bates, and Salmon Chase, all who would become future members of Lincoln’s presidential
cabinet. Lincoln was a come-from-behind, surprise winner, some say from luck, some say from
strategy, and some say from the miscalculation of his opponents concerning his chances of
obtaining the nomination (Goodwin 2005, 254). In reality, Lincoln had strong political intuition
and he had developed a strong group of lifelong friends and political allies, avoiding making any
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major enemies, and these were key factors in his successful nomination. His profound sense of
ambition and desire for success was free of malice and opportunism and he was fiercely
committed to his ideals and values regardless of what he felt others would think of them
(Goodwin 2005, 256). Following his successful nomination for presidency, Lincoln was quite
passive, avoiding large rallies and instead quietly observing the political climate and reaching out
to his defeated Republican opponents and working with them to become a more united party
(White 2009, 332). On election day on November 6, 1860, Lincoln defeated Democrat John C.
Breckinridge, winning 180 electoral votes and 40% of the popular vote (Donald 1995, 256). Few
could have predicted Abraham Lincoln’s rise to the presidency, a man who came from humble
beginnings and “undistinguished families” in rural Kentucky, to becoming one of the most
famous and revered men in United States history.
This basic biographical story of Lincoln leading up to the 1860 presidential election is
important to understand and many biographers and scholars of Lincoln have presented this
information in addition to their personal perspectives of Lincoln’s character. There are many
points surrounding Lincoln’s personality on which scholars can agree, but there are also
controversies. One important quality of Lincoln is that he was an individual that possessed a
strong moral character. Miller comments that what Lincoln’s influences were, meaning the
individuals or institutions that shaped this moral understanding, are hard to define (Miller 2002,
57). According to scholar Ronald White, Lincoln embodied Aristotle’s definition that ethos, or
integrity, is the key to persuasion and gaining respect (White 2009, 3). Lincoln won the
nickname “Honest Abe” when his store in New Salem went bankrupt and instead of cutting and
running like most men of his time would do, Lincoln stayed and paid back what he came to call
his “National Debt” (White 2009). Lincoln was an individual that, once he acquired certain
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opinions and ideas, they stayed with him, meaning his moral and political positions were not
lightly abandoned (Miller 2002, 14). His wife, Mary Todd Lincoln, used the word “stubborn” to
describe the way in which her husband adopted certain political or personal positions (Miller
2002). Despite this stubbornness, throughout his life Lincoln was an individual that was humble
and admitted when he was wrong. White writes that, “Lincoln gave voice to a principle- the
willingness to both admit mistakes and learn from them- that was becoming a part of his moral
character” (White 2005, 177).
Lincoln clearly was also seen as a strong leader, someone who easily created close and
trusting relationships. Following Lincoln’s first political defeat in 1832 he spent the next two
years garnering support and building relationships and ultimately won the seat in 1834. White
writes, “In a brief two years, Lincoln’s abilities and experiences began to coalesce into his gifts
of leadership” (60). Even as a young boy within the classroom, his peers saw him as a leader.
They admired his ability to tell stories and in their eyes he was an exceptional individual,
extremely intelligent, and a self-confident and charismatic person (Donald 1995, 32). Each place
that Lincoln moved to, from New Salem, to Springfield, and to Washington D.C., he easily
created strong relationships with those around him, and he had the ability to make people laugh
and to listen to what he wanted to convey. He also was an individual who could bring people
with varying perspectives and personal interests together and was someone who respected the
dignity of those around him. White writes that “Lincoln’s genius was his ability to draw upon the
talents of others, meld together diverse personalities who often did not trust one another, and
then listen to their advice, recognizing that it was sometimes wiser than his own” (319). Author
Bruce Miroff echoes similar sentiments, writing that, “Lincoln did not treat subordinates as
instruments of his masterful will; he followed the dictates of an ethic of care and paid heed to
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their individual needs” (1993, 108). As evidenced, Lincoln was good with people, and this is a
large element into what made him so politically successful, as throughout his life he had built a
strong network of relationships within many different spheres of people and he respected those
around him, regardless of their viewpoints and opinions.
Also throughout his life Lincoln had developed a strength of will, what Miller calls “his
resolution, the gem of his character”, through his growing confidence in his intellectual abilities
(2002, 64). He writes, “Not every person in young Lincoln’s situation, no matter how smart,
would have had the strength of purpose to carry out that remarkable series of self-initiated
projects of self-education that started with virtually teaching himself to read and then proceeding
to read anything he could get his hands on” (2002, 64). It was not only Lincoln’s intellectual
abilities that set him apart from others around him, but it was also his sense of himself and what
he had the capability of being that made him stand out to others. Miroff writes that, “Charles
Dana, Lincoln’s assistant secretary of war, recalled that ‘even in his freest moments one always
felt the presence of a will and an intellectual power which maintained the ascendancy of the
President’” (1993, 85). Many individuals that spent time around Lincoln would say similar
things about being in his presence, feeling his strong will and intellectual abilities that
distinguished him from many others around him.
Despite these positive qualities of Lincoln, he also experienced dark periods of his life
that show a deeper side within him. Perhaps one of the darkest moments of Lincoln’s life, one in
which he faced a true personal crisis, came when he broke off his engagement with Mary Todd.
He had many anxieties about his upcoming marriage, as he wasn’t sure he had the ability to
support a wife (Goodwin 2005, 99). Following the dissolution of the engagement, Lincoln
stopped attending the legislature and withdrew from the Springfield social scene, becoming
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depressed and almost suicidal. He was discouraged by the fact that if he were to die, he had
“done nothing to make any human being remember that he had lived” (Goodwin 2005, 99). Even
in the darkest moment of his life, his desire to be remembered carried him forward and through
his resilience and his convictions, he gradually overcame his depression (Goodwin 2005).
Many scholars have examined Lincoln’s level of ambition, and while most scholars
believe that he was a very ambitious individual, there are others who are not quite convinced.
One such scholar is historian David Donald, who in his biography of Lincoln, believed that
Lincoln’s character was quite passive. Donald bases this off of a letter that Lincoln wrote to a
Kentucky Unionist in 1864 in which he wrote, “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess
plainly that events have controlled me” (McPherson 1995, 5). Elsewhere in the biography,
Donald talks about Lincoln’s “fatalism”, and that he had a “reluctance to make bold plans”
(McPherson 1995). As the Civil War continued, Lincoln came to believe that he couldn’t alter
the sequence of events that only God could. There are many interesting examples of Lincoln
appealing to faith throughout the war, believing that he couldn’t control the events that would
occur. McPherson, who writes this article about Donald’s characterization of Lincoln, believes
that while there may have been moments in which Lincoln felt that he was constrained by fate,
there were many decisions that he made, including his decision to issue the Emancipation
Proclamation, that were the opposite of passive. This element of Lincoln that Donald identifies
certainly provides greater complexity to Lincoln’s character, as there is some evidence to why he
would view Lincoln as passive. It is just one more element to try and grapple with in the
attempted understanding of Lincoln’s multifaceted character.
Apart from Donald and a few others, most scholars believe that he was a very ambitious
person, especially regarding his desire to be a remembered figure in history. Scholar William Lee
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Miller writes, “Out of the potent stew of these ingredients there was brewed within him an
intense drive to make his name mean something in the world- a ‘thirst for distinction’. Lincoln is
consistently said to have been ‘ambitious’” (2002, 64). Doris Kearns Goodwin echoes Miller
writing that, “Even as a child Lincoln dreamed heroic dreams. From the outset he was cognizant
of a destiny far beyond that of his unlettered father and hardscrabble childhood . . . His mind and
ambition, his childhood friend Nathaniel Grigsby recalled, ‘soared above us. He naturally
assumed the leadership of the boys’” (2005, 49).
White also recognizes these qualities in Lincoln, especially through Lincoln’s words
following his decision to run for state legislature in 1832 saying, “Every man is said to have his
peculiar ambition. I have no other so great as that of being truly esteemed by my fellow men, by
rendering myself worthy of their esteem. How far I shall succeed in gratifying this ambition, is
yet to be developed” (White 2009, 49). This shows a true insight into several of Lincoln’s
beliefs. He was aware that ambition can lead to selfishness and egotism, and that in order to be
esteemed, he had to gain that by rendering himself worthy from those around him (White 2009).
With his first taste of politics, Lincoln possessed the dream that he would restate several times
throughout his life: the desire to prove himself worthy and to win the trust and respect of his
fellow citizens (Goodwin 2005, 87). Following his one term as a U.S. representative, Lincoln felt
that he still hadn’t made his mark and there remained the desire to leave a legacy, stating in 1850
that, “How hard, oh how hard it is to die and leave one’s country no better than if one had never
lived” (White 2009, 168). It is quite interesting that Lincoln seemed to connect being
remembered in history only with being involved in the political world, not something that he
could achieve through his legal career. Lincoln’s desire to be remembered is a common theme
throughout his life and his ambition in achieving this desire was evident from a young age. As a
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young boy, Lincoln read many books that dealt with the triumph of good over evil and that
demonstrated the possibility that ordinary people could do extraordinary things, and he instilled
this belief within himself as a child (White 2009).
Miller writes that Lincoln was able to accomplish such a dramatic ascent in the political
world through his extraordinary efforts, but also through the fact that his ambition was a product
of his time, as Lincoln was encouraged by the “ethos of the new country” (2002, 23). His intense
desire to leave a legacy was but one source of his greatness, but it also led to some things that he
did that may be not so worthy of praise (Miller 2002, 65). Politics was the ideal vocation for
Lincoln to achieve his desire of being remembered. It played upon his some of his greatest
strengths, including persuading people through his rhetorical ability, making speeches, writing,
and thriving amidst having attention (Miller 2002, 94). Lincoln’s law partner William Herndon
characterized Lincoln’s ambition as “a little engine that knew no rest” and commented that, “the
vicissitudes of a political campaign brought into play all his tact and management and developed
to its fullest extent his latent industry” (2002, 302).
One of the key speeches that Lincoln made that indirectly reveals much about himself is
the Lyceum speech, which he gave in Springfield, Illinois when he was just shy of twenty-nine
years old and still a largely unknown politician. Author Bruce Miroff writes that the Lyceum
speech “has been treated not merely as a fascinating foreshadowing of central themes in
Lincoln’s later career but as an essential key to everything that Lincoln was to become” (Miroff
1993, 86). It was a speech in which Lincoln spoke against the institution of slavery and against
the threat of an increasing disregard for the law and an upsurge in mob violence (Miroff 1993).
The speech also reveals a lot about Lincoln’s thoughts on ambition. Historian Edmund Wilson
has closely examined Lincoln’s Lyceum speech, which he believes contained a warning against
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the overly ambitious leader, a “tyrant” of sorts, a figure that Lincoln described with both
admiration and apprehension. Wilson claims that Lincoln’s admiration of the ambitious leader
was a clue to his own desires, as this speech both projected Lincoln into the role of the ambitious
leader while also speaking against this style of leader (Miroff 1993, 87). Other historians have
disagreed with Wilson’s claim that Lincoln was projecting himself into the role of an overly
ambitious leader, and they have concluded that the Lyceum speech, instead, identified the
emergence of a genius and a savior of the republic (Miroff 1993, 87). Miroff believes that the
Lyceum speech does provide us with an important window into who Lincoln was, but that it is
not the defining element for understanding him. It certainly deals with the question of Lincoln’s
sense of ambition, something that he would continue to grapple with throughout his life. Miroff
then identifies three different themes or versions of ambition that Lincoln embodied throughout
his life: greatness as liberator of the oppressed, posthumous fame through service in a noble
cause, and martyrdom to liberty (Miroff 1993, 90).
This first theme can be seen in a piece of Lincoln’s writing that is included within the
Collected Works, where Lincoln expresses his desire to be famous and remembered as great, but
only justified through his ability to “elevate the oppressed”. Miroff writes that, “Lincoln wanted
no monarch’s crown; he wanted the fame of a true republican (1993, 90). The second theme is
evidenced through the previous scholars that were reviewed, and that is Lincoln’s desire to be
remembered after his death. There are multiple instances of Lincoln expressing this desire and
his ambition drove him to try and establish his legacy in the nation’s history. The third theme,
the role of martyr to liberty, was something that “struck a deep chord within Lincoln” (Miroff
1993, 91). This theme of ambition in Lincoln’s life reveals an ambition that wasn’t always
positive, as Miroff writes, “Lincoln’s images of martyrdom testify to the powerful ambivalence
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of his ambition. They are grandiose, the fantasies of a man whose ambitions demanded heroic
fulfillment. They are also self-sacrificing, checking egotism by throwing away life itself in the
name of liberty” (1993, 92).
In addition to Lincoln’s ambitious desires, he also had a lot of emotional need, and
popular support and public office were two of his most important sources of self-esteem (Miroff
1993). Lincoln’s self-esteem is a topic that many historians have grappled with, and it seems to
be intricately connected with his ambition. How Lincoln’s self-esteem affected the way he
conducted himself in the political world is still greatly debated. Some historians say that he was
able to separate his self-esteem from politics and other historians and Lincoln scholars disagree.
After reviewing all the complex and informative details about Lincoln’s character, a final
account of who Lincoln was is summed up well by Miroff,
Lincoln’s gentleness and kindness were not the marks of an effusive character. He could
be aloof, brooding, mysterious. But out of the depths of his personality and response to
experience he developed a masculine/feminine temperament that governed his personal
relationships. His fusion of an ethic of rights and an ethic of care was a matter of political
conviction as well as temperament. As a democratic leader, Lincoln believed that he must not
only represent and educate the people as a collectivity but also care for the dignity and needs of
the individual (111).
Using these conceptions of Lincoln’s character from several different political and
historical scholars, it is important to give a preliminary assessment of how the character
framework’s categories can be applied to Lincoln. As character is largely consistent according to
Renshon, one should be able to identify these character elements in Lincoln before he was
elected president. We can then later reevaluate them with each additional case study that is
examined. It is clear from examining several different perspectives from varying historical
scholars that Lincoln possessed a high level of ambition, strong ability to create and maintain
good interpersonal relationships, and a strong sense of moral character and integrity. One of the
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biggest indicators of Lincoln’s high level of ambition is his desire to be a remembered figure in
history, a desire that he held since childhood and brought up in many instances throughout his
life. Some historians argue that Lincoln’s ambitious desires were not healthy, to use Renshon’s
words that his ambition may have been problematic and not productive (Renshon 1996). The
Lyceum speech provides an interesting juxtaposition of the two types of ambition, and some
historians say that Lincoln embraced the good type of ambition and others say that he embraced
the problematic side of ambition, highlighting an area of Lincoln’s ambition that is not fully
agreed upon. Lincoln also possessed strong inner drive, especially in his political life and in his
sense of his own potential, which is another indicator of high ambition.
Concerning integrity, one of the important aspects is having a developed and
consolidated identity. Politically, Lincoln strongly stuck to his ideals and he developed his
political identity over time within the Illinois state legislature and the U.S. House of
Representatives. Lincoln did switch to the Republican Party and was instrumental in its
organization, however many Whigs like Lincoln transitioned into the Republican Party as it more
closely advocated for their values, especially on the issue of slavery. Another important factor is
that, despite loss, a president still sticks to their convictions. Lincoln lost his first election in
1832, and despite this loss, he stuck to his ideals, extended his network of supporters and won
the election in 1834. Later in his political career, he lost the Senate race in 1858 to Stephen
Douglas, and again, he did not abandon his beliefs and values, and ultimately was elected
president in 1860.
Lincoln’s relatedness was also quite strong. He had an extensive network of friends, and
easily created and maintained good and trusting relationships throughout his life. He was
someone who was very inclusive with a wide variety of people, and other people felt very
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comfortable around him. He wanted to include many people within his circle, even if they had
different perspectives and viewpoints than himself. Perhaps one of the best examples of
Lincoln’s high relatedness was his appointing of each of his four rivals in the 1860 election into
important posts within his cabinet, and he was able to bring them together to produce a diverse
and effective group. The final element is emotional intelligence, and here is an element that is
debatable. It seems that at times Lincoln was able to separate his grief, anger, or frustration from
his political career, but other times his emotions largely got in the way. One example showcasing
that Lincoln’s emotional intelligence was lower was his depressive state following the breaking
off of his engagement with Mary Todd, when he was unable to attend the state legislature and
had no motivation to work. However, when Lincoln’s second son Eddie Lincoln died of
tuberculosis, he was very sad and spent time grieving, but was seemingly able to separate his
emotions from his political and legal career.
Based upon this initial analysis, Lincoln largely exhibited high ambition, strong integrity
and an innate ability to create and maintain good relationships. We will see if the presence of
these elements identified from Lincoln’s earlier life is evident when Lincoln is president and then
determine their influence on Lincoln’s leadership and judgment when he was making decisions
as president. A further analysis of each individual case will yield more a significant
understanding and help to determine how the character theoretical framework and the strategic
action framework can help in explaining successful or unsuccessful decisions.
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CHAPTER 5: EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION
One cannot conceive of Abraham Lincoln as president without the Emancipation
Proclamation. His decision to draft and implement the Emancipation Proclamation remains of
one his most important decisions that he made as president; in fact it is regarded as one of the
most important decisions any president has ever made, giving him the title the Great
Emancipator. Ultimately, what makes the Emancipation Proclamation so important a decision is
that it was Lincoln’s strongest weapon that ultimately helped the Union win the Civil War
(Klingaman 2001, 2). Despite Lincoln’s own personal views on slavery, he issued the
Proclamation first and foremost as a military necessity. It did not free all of the slaves, it left
around 750,000 slaves in bondage, but the remaining 3 million were declared free (Foner 2012).
William Klingaman writes, “Measured against Lincoln’s wartime expectations, the
Emancipation Proclamation proved a resounding success” (2001, 288). One can see Lincoln’s
decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation as a success in two different ways. The first is
that the Emancipation Proclamation was a successful and strategic war decision, which
ultimately helped the Union to win the war (the success that Lincoln intended it to be). The
second way that the Emancipation Proclamation was a successful decision is that, even though
Lincoln did not issue it for reasons of justice and racial equality, it disrupted the slave system
that had been in place for centuries and immediately gave new opportunities to blacks living
within the Confederate states and ultimately helped to free all of the slaves after the Union won
the war.
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The Narrative
This narrative will attempt to give a brief historical account of Lincoln’s decision-making
process in issuing the Emancipation Proclamation. As one will see, there were multiple different
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justifications that Lincoln used to make the decision, and these factors can be summed up into
three key rationales. The first rationale Lincoln used was moral reasoning. Lincoln had been an
individual that thought that slavery was an inherently unjust institution and that the country and
its government could not survive “half slave and half free” (Donald 1995, 206). There were
times in Lincoln’s thinking process that he appealed to faith and to God to give him a sign of
what to do about slavery, and he struggled in reconciling his moral duties as a human being and
his political duties as president. The second factor was a constitutional one. Did he have the
power, as commander in chief, to issue the proclamation? Lincoln sought to find meaning within
the Constitution to justify his ability to issue an emancipation proclamation as an emergency war
power. The final factor was one of military strategy. Issuing the Emancipation Proclamation,
according to Lincoln’s reasoning, was a strategic decision, one that would help to ultimately end
the war and reunite the country. These final two factors were linked together by the fact that the
constitutional rationale depended upon the military rationale. Lincoln sought to balance these
three factors when making his decision, and the following narrative shows that his thinking is
oftentimes contradictory. It is clear that he was conflicted about how to justify his decision, as he
wanted to both do the right thing and win the war.
The process of Lincoln deciding to issue an emancipation proclamation to when it was
signed and enacted was relatively short, only about ten months, from March of 1862 to January
of 1863. It began in early March, when Lincoln invited Senator Charles Sumner to his office and
read him a plan that he had prepared to give to Congress that would implement gradual,
compensated emancipation, providing federal funds to states that adopted a plan for the
abolishment of slavery. Sumner was shocked, as no president had ever asked Congress to adopt
any type of emancipation measure, but, as a leader of the antislavery movement, Sumner
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supported the plan (Klingaman 2001, 105). Later that month, Lincoln presented the plan to
Congress and asked them to pass a resolution providing federal aid to any state willing to
implement a plan that would abolish slavery within their borders (Goodwin 2005, 459). The plan
was based upon Lincoln’s conviction that since slavery was, “the disease of the entire nation . . .
all must share the suffering of its removal” (Klingaman 2001, 105). His plan was most directed
towards the representatives from the border states, and Lincoln concluded in his message to
Congress that in his first annual address he had pledged to employ “all indispensable means” to
preserve the Union (Klingaman 2001). Lincoln recognized that slavery was a central issue in the
war, and it was an institution that was crumbling, therefore he hoped that some of the border
state delegates could see the value that gradual emancipation would provide in potentially ending
the war. The majority of moderate Republicans and several Democrats supported Lincoln’s plan,
but not a single representative from the border states approved of the plan (Klingaman 2001,
108). The border state representatives argued that emancipation, in any form, would only
lengthen the war and it would “further consolidate the spirit of rebellion in the seceded states and
fan the spirit of secession among loyal slaveholders in the Border States” (Goodwin 2005, 459).
They believed that they would face backlash from their constituents if they supported the plan,
and they thought the proposal would cost more than what the federal government could actually
pay (Goodwin 2005).
Within the war, the strategy of the Union army in the spring months of 1862 was largely
guided by the Peninsula Campaign under the leadership of General George B. McClellan, who
was in command of the Army of the Potomac. The Peninsula campaign was a Union offensive
strategy with the intention of capturing the Confederate capital at Richmond (Goodwin 2005,
424). Throughout the months of April to June 1862, General McClellan and his army fought
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their way towards Richmond, however they were largely unsuccessful due to the military
prowess of Confederate General Robert E. Lee and the hesitation to attack by McClellan
(Goodwin 2005, 444). The devastating reverses from the Peninsula Campaign during that
summer made it clear to Lincoln that extraordinary measures were needed in order for the Union
to be saved (Goodwin 2005, 462). Lincoln knew that if the Confederacy were rid of their slaves,
these slaves could potentially join the Union forces, which would serve as a large advantage for
the Union Army. With this new turn of events, Lincoln was able to see emancipation in a new
light, as a military necessity, not just a moral obligation. As mentioned previously, Lincoln’s
compensated, gradual emancipation plan was based upon his conviction that slavery was a
disease to the country, clearly more of a moral argument, but the events of the war allowed him
to consider another rationale for issuing an emancipation proclamation, which was as a military
strategy. Lincoln wrote that, “Things had gone from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached
the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our
last card, and must change our tactics or lose the game. I am now determined upon the adoption
of the emancipation policy; and without consultation with, or the knowledge of the Cabinet, I
prepared the original draft of the proclamation” (Klingaman 2001, 139).
Lincoln conceived of and drafted the Emancipation Proclamation on his own, finally
informing several others of his plan in mid-July of 1862. He had been working on the draft since
late June, and in it he referenced the Militia Act of 1862, warning the rebellious states that if they
did not cease participating in the rebellion and rejoin the Union, that he, as commander in chief,
would declare free all slaves within this territory on January 1, 1863 (Brewster 2014, 257). The
first person that he showed the draft to was his vice president Hannibal Hamlin (Klingaman
2001). It seems that Lincoln told his vice president first because Hamlin had urged him to issue a
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proclamation before, as Lincoln told Hamlin that, “you have often urged me to issue a
proclamation of emancipation. I am about to do it. I have it here, and you will be the first person
to see it (Klingaman 2001, 140). He then told Navy Secretary Gideon Welles and Secretary of
State Henry Seward of his plans to free the slaves while in a carriage on the way to Secretary of
War Edward Bates’ son’s funeral (Brewster 2014, 12). It is not clear why he decided to tell these
two individuals at this time; it is possible that he felt like he needed to confide in others about his
plans. He told Welles and Seward that he had, “dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance, and
delicacy of the subject and had come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity absolutely
essential for the salvation of the Union, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued”
(Goodwin 2005, 463). Seward was hesitant to respond to Lincoln’s announcement, as he said
that he needed to give the matter further thought, although he assured Lincoln that the rebellion
justified a presidential emancipation decree (Klingaman 2001, 149). Welles was so surprised by
Lincoln’s announcement that he couldn’t do any more than agree with what Seward had said.
Welles later wrote that up until that moment, whenever emancipation had been brought up to
Lincoln, Lincoln had been prompt in denouncing any interference by the government concerning
slavery. But it was clear to Welles that McClellan’s Peninsula campaign failure had pushed
Lincoln “to adopt extraordinary measures to preserve the national existence” (Klingaman 2001,
149).
On July 22, 1862, Lincoln read the preliminary draft of the Emancipation Proclamation to
his cabinet. Lincoln told them that he welcomed any suggestions after hearing the draft, but that
he had made up his mind and had not called them together to ask their advice on whether he
should issue the proclamation or not (Goodwin 2005, 464). The document expressed that if the
rebellion by the Confederate states continued, he would use his authority as commander in chief
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to issue an emancipation proclamation that would free all of the slaves within the states in
rebellion (Klingaman 2001, 156). Members of his cabinet were divided on whether the
proclamation should be issued. Attorney General Edward Bates was the first to respond, and he
voiced his support for the proclamation, adding that he wished that it would be accompanied by a
plan for the deportation of the freed slaves (Brewster 2014, 76). Secretary of the Treasury
Salmon Chase did not fully support the issuance of the proclamation, preferring a “quieter”
method of emancipation, worrying that Lincoln’s proclamation could lead to a race war
(Brewster 2014). Postmaster General Montgomery Blair strongly opposed the proclamation, and
his rationale was that there would be political repercussions for the Republican Party if Lincoln
issued the proclamation (Brewster 2014). Secretary of War Edwin Stanton instantly saw the
military reasoning behind the document and supported issuing the proclamation (Goodwin 2005,
465). Finally, Secretary of State Seward, who already knew of the document’s existence,
supported the emancipation, but not the timing. He suggested that Lincoln should wait for a
Union victory and then issue the proclamation, as the Union Army had experienced large defeats
throughout the summer and issuing the proclamation presently would seem an act of desperation
(Brewster 2014, 84). Better to wait for a military victory and issue it with the Union supported
by a military success. Lincoln agreed with Seward’s suggestion and put the document aside until
a Union victory was achieved.
From mid-July until August, Lincoln was constantly thinking about the proclamation,
making minor edits to the document, and anxiously waiting for a Union victory. While waiting,
Lincoln set out to educate public opinion and attempt to prepare the country for possible
emancipation of the slaves within the rebellious states. Lincoln believed that one of the main
stumbling blocks to issuing the proclamation was the fear by whites, in both the North and
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South, that the two races could never peacefully coexist within society (Donald 1995, 367).
Lincoln seemed to share this fear, which can be demonstrated by a meeting that Lincoln held in
mid-August where he met with a delegation of freed slaves. From the meeting, he hoped to
garner their support and cooperation in educating blacks on the benefits of colonization (not on
the intended emancipation). He told the delegation that the black race had endured “the greatest
wrong inflicted on any people”, but that “when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far removed
from being placed on equality with the white race” (Goodwin 2005, 469). Thus, Lincoln felt it
better that the races be separated following any emancipation. The delegation was vehemently
against his proposal, and the news spread around Washington of Lincoln’s contentious meeting.
Perhaps the most scathing of criticisms following this meeting came from journalist
Horace Greeley who wrote in the New York Tribune that he, writing for all slaves (although he
was not black, nor a slave), was “sorely disappointed and deeply pained by the policy you
[Lincoln] seem to be pursuing with regard to the slaves of the Rebels” (Brewster 2014, 106).
Greeley implored Lincoln to change his current position on attempting to gradually emancipate
and colonize the slave population within the South, however he may have viewed Lincoln’s
course of action differently if he had known of Lincoln’s plans to issue the Emancipation
Proclamation. Lincoln’s response to Greeley is one of the most famous passages that he wrote,
emphasizing that “If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I
could save it by freeing all slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and
leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do
because I believe it helps the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I don’t believe it
would help to save the Union” (Brewster 2014, 106). It was a statement that left several different
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options open to Lincoln, freeing all of the slaves, none of the slaves, or some of the slaves,
anything that would save the Union.
On September 17, 1863, Lincoln finally got his Union victory. The Battle of Antietam
resulted in Confederate forces, led by Robert E. Lee, retreating across the Potomac, and while
the battle was not a resounding victory, as the Union armed failed to pursue the Confederate
forces, it was the long-awaited event that Lincoln had been anticipating (Goodwin 2005, 481).
Following the victory at Antietam, Lincoln spent the next several days revising his draft of the
Emancipation Proclamation, the draft that would become the final draft, and on September 22, he
read his final draft to his cabinet. The final draft still freed only the slaves within the rebellious
states, but in the final version Lincoln had added that freed slaves would be welcomed within the
Union armies (Brewster 2014, 233). Lincoln had also added, at the suggestion of Chase, the sole
mention of morality within the document, writing that, “And upon this act, believed to be an act
of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate
judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God (emphasis added, Klingaman
2001, 229). He knew the circumstances were not ideal, but he admitted that he had made a
promise to God, a moral rationale, saying, “I made a solemn vow before God, that if General Lee
was driven back from Pennsylvania, I would crown the result by the declaration of freedom to
the slaves” (Klingaman 2001, 187). Reading the document, it cited his position and his authority,
as chief executive, to emancipate the slave as an emergency military measure undertaken in
order to save the Union that was warranted by the Constitution. He set the date of January 1,
1863 as the day that slaves within the rebellious states would be freed if they did not restore
themselves to the Union. And thus, the Emancipation Proclamation was issued on September 22,
1863 and took effect on January 1, 1863. When Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation
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he stated that, “I never, in my life, felt more certain that I was doing right, than I do in signing
this paper. If my name ever goes into history it will be for this act, and my whole soul is in it”
(Goodwin 2005, 499).
One can see that Lincoln, in his cabinet meeting in which he read the final draft of the
Emancipation Proclamation, cited moral, constitutional, and military strategy rationales for the
issuing of the document. Morally, Lincoln had held the belief that slavery was wrong, and he
viewed the Confederate defeat at Antietam as a sign from God to issue the proclamation and free
the slaves within the rebel states. Militarily, he cited that the proclamation was an emergency
military measure and that he had constitutional authority as commander in chief to issue it. From
start to finish, the Emancipation Proclamation was conceived of, issued, and signed all in less
than a year. It was a resounding action to be taken by a president, as there was no precedent for
the use of presidential powers in this way. Lincoln was the first president who was in the distinct
position of authorizing unilateral power in the name of national security, which was a
controversial issue as none of his predecessors has conceived of or expanded their powers in this
way (Tichenor 2013, 776). Contrary to popular belief, the Emancipation Proclamation was not a
statement of the equality and justice that blacks deserved, and many find fault with Lincoln for
that. The infamous title of Great Emancipator has been tied to Lincoln’s legacy, but to Lincoln,
the document was first and foremost a military measure designed to save the Union. While the
proclamation destroyed an inherently unjust institution and ultimately gave freedom to an entire
people, it is arguable that this title of Great Emancipator is not so deserved. Despite these
questions of morality and equality, the Emancipation Proclamation is regarded by many as an
extremely successful decision, and it is important to further analyze what made Lincoln’s
decision a success (Klingaman 2001; Brewster 2014).
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Analysis Using the Character Theoretical Framework
Can one attribute the Emancipation Proclamation’s success to Lincoln’s character? If we
look to the character elements previously developed, i.e. ambition, integrity, relatedness, and
emotional intelligence, can one determine that these elements are present or that they affected
Lincoln’s decision-making? And if they are present, what can we observe in Lincoln’s political
leadership and judgment? From my initial assessment, Lincoln possessed high levels of
ambition, integrity, and relatedness. First, in looking at ambition, Lincoln, when signing the
Emancipation Proclamation, stated that if he were to be remembered in history, it would be for
this document. This is probably true, however Lincoln’s process of making the decision to issue
the Emancipation Proclamation, seems to have come from a purely military strategic reasoning,
not as an action that would give him a historical legacy. If Lincoln had been using this document
to achieve a renowned place in history, it is not evident from the information previously
discussed.
What is quite indicative of ambition in Lincoln’s decision-making is the use of his
political position to enact transformational policy, as the Emancipation Proclamation is arguably
one of the most transformational policies enacted by any president. Lincoln sought to justify his
actions from his constitutional authority as commander in chief and before issuing the
proclamation, he wasn’t sure that he possessed that amount of power. An individual working
within the War Department, a lawyer named William Whiting, produced an argument for
Lincoln that outlined the powers that he was entitled to under the Constitution. Whiting told
Lincoln that the Constitution should be interpreted by “common sense” and that the document
only provided a framework of government and that, within that framework, there existed
whatever presidential or legal power needed to meet the nation’s changing needs (Perret 2004,
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198). Lincoln could demonstrate a compelling military necessity for his actions based upon this
constitutional interpretation and Lincoln later said that, “as commander-in-chief of the army and
navy, in time of war . . . I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy. I
conceive that I may in an emergency do things on military grounds that cannot be done
constitutionally by Congress” (McPherson 2008, 269). Legal scholar John Yoo writes that,
“Lincoln’s greatness in preserving the Union depended crucially on his discovery of the broad
executive powers inherent in Article II for use during war or emergency” (Tichenor 2013, 773).
The Emancipation Proclamation played a large role in the Union ultimately winning the war, and
Lincoln’s ambition in achieving a Union victory came through his redefined presidential
authority and the transformative policy of the proclamation.
Ambition also includes inner drive and self-initiative, which I believe that Lincoln
demonstrated throughout his decision-making. Eric Foner writes that, “The hallmark of
Lincoln’s greatness was his combination of bedrock principle with open-mindedness and
capacity for growth. That summer, with his preferred approach going nowhere, he moved in the
direction of immediate emancipation” (2012). Lincoln had conceived of issuing a proclamation
freeing the slaves before he told anyone about his plans, but the way in which he originally
envisioned it, gradual emancipation and colonization, was no longer viable due to the events
happening in the war in the summer of 1862. Gradual emancipation, while Lincoln’s preferred
method, would not help the Union win the war. He needed to take action that would impact the
Confederate’s ability to continue fighting the war and an immediate emancipation of the slaves
within the rebellious states would be detrimental to the Confederacy, thus, Lincoln took it upon
himself to act in a more drastic manner. His decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation
was interestingly private. Even when he told members of his cabinet about issuing the
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proclamation in the initial meeting in July, and in the meeting in which he read them the final
draft in September, Lincoln emphasized that the decision was his own and it was already made;
that he only wanted suggestions on the language and the wording of the document. Lincoln’s
decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation was a go-it-alone situation, completely driven
by his own initiative. Based upon his demonstrated inner drive and self-initiative, and also his
ability to enact transformational policy, I believe there is sufficient evidence that shows that
Lincoln’s ambition was an evident factor within his decision-making.
An interesting factor within the decision to issue the proclamation was Lincoln’s
integrity. One factor of a president possessing integrity is their willingness to take personal and
political risks while still sticking to their values. The Emancipation Proclamation was one of the
greatest risks of Lincoln’s presidency, and his decision to issue it certainly challenged his
integrity. One of the main risks that Lincoln recognized was that the issuance of an emancipation
proclamation could inspire a “coup d’état” within the Union army, as there were some
individuals within the army that wanted to rid the nation of slavery, others not, and some that
would see the seizing of property, i.e. the slaves, as an unfair way to fight a war (Brewster 2014,
63). A second risk would be that it would fail as a military tactic, as freed slaves could stay to
fight for the South, serving to bolster the Confederacy. Freeing the slaves could also lead to an
all-out race war of blacks against whites (Brewster 2014). Despite these risks and the multiple
matters that could have gone awry, Lincoln still issued the Emancipation Proclamation, believing
that the potential benefits outweighed the risks.
Todd Brewster writes that, “Lincoln, who had spoken out forcefully against slavery for
decades, had just authored a proclamation of freedom without mentioning the most forceful
argument for doing it, which is that it was the right thing to do” (160). Lincoln, before becoming
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president, had spoken out against the expansion of slavery within new territories and had been a
proponent of gradual and compensated emancipation and colonization. Lincoln thought that
blacks and whites could never be truly equal, as evidenced by his statement to the delegation of
freed blacks he met with in the summer of 1862. Lincoln “had believed in a gradual, peaceful,
and compensated path to the extinction of slavery, one that took into account the interests of both
slaveholders and slaves, that rejected the riskiness of sudden emancipation with its harsh rebuke
and potential for violence” (Brewster 2014, 239). Even though Lincoln resorted to the risky
direct and sudden emancipation that Brewster mentions, he had tried to convince others and find
support for gradual and compensated emancipation before he ultimately decided to issue the
proclamation. The Emancipation Proclamation was a huge risk for Lincoln to take, and while
some could challenge his integrity concerning the decision, I believe that evidence shows that
Lincoln always preferred and stuck to his belief that gradual emancipation was the best option,
but he recognized that path was not what was going to ultimately reunite the country.
Integrity also includes putting one’s convictions to the ultimate test of loss. The
Emancipation Proclamation could have had a number of different and possibly detrimental
outcomes, and there were individuals that told Lincoln this. However, “despite repeated
warnings that the issuance of the proclamation would have harmful consequences for the
Union’s cause, Lincoln never considered retracting his pledge. As Frederick Douglass had
perceived, once the president staked himself to a forward position, he did not give up ground”
(Goodwin 2005, 497). Interestingly enough Lincoln,
had made a vow, a covenant, that if God gave us the victory in the approaching battle, he would
consider it an indication of Divine will, and that it was his duty to move forward in the cause of
emancipation. It might be thought strange, he said, that he had in this way submitted the disposal
of the matter when the way was not clear to his mind what he should do. God had decided this
question in favor of the slaves. He was satisfied it was right, was confirmed and strengthened in
his action by the vow and the results (Burlingame 2008, 407).
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Despite Lincoln’s moral reasoning concerning divine will, his decision to issue the Emancipation
Proclamation showed a true sense of integrity. He was willing to take a large risk and was also
willing to put his beliefs to the ultimate test of loss. Lincoln had the option to let the war to
continue to play out organically, and while he may have thought that he the Union would lose the
war if he didn’t take more drastic action, he risked issuing the Emancipation Proclamation,
which, if it had failed, could have certainly led to Union defeat.
Relatedness does not seem to have played a large role in Lincoln’s decision-making, as
he kept his decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation largely to himself. He told only a
few people about his plans before he announced it to his cabinet. Lincoln certainly trusted and
respected the individuals within his cabinet to tell them of his decision, however he didn’t want
their opinions, only suggestions, of which the only one he took into account was Seward’s
suggestion to wait for a Union victory before issuing the proclamation. Lincoln didn’t mistreat or
disrespect any of the members of his cabinet throughout his decision-making process, he simply
felt that he did not need to listen to their opinions and garner their support for issuing the
Emancipation Proclamation. In terms of the factor of emotional intelligence, which is the ability
to not allow one’s personal emotions to affect their job, waiting for a Union victory was difficult
and frustrating for Lincoln, but he managed to retain his patience and resolve until the Battle of
Antietam, despite heavy Union losses in August. Lincoln’s ability to remain calm and focused
amidst so many uncertainties and pressure from all sides is a sign of his emotional intelligence.
Based upon the presence of these character elements within Lincoln’s decision-making,
can one then see demonstrated political leadership and good judgment? Strong political
leadership includes the ability to mobilize, orchestrate, and consolidate public opinion about
specific policies and political visions. While waiting for a Union victory, Lincoln attempted to
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try to prepare and educate the public for possible emancipation. Harold Holzer calls Lincoln a
public relations genius because, “what Lincoln allowed the public to know- and when- served,
however fitfully, imperfectly, even insultingly, to prepare the country’s white majority for black
freedom even as it has served since to sully Lincoln’s reputation as an emancipator” (37). Holzer
outlines that Lincoln had calculated a three-tiered strategy to a) modify his original draft to close
loopholes and to revise, b) work to prepare the nation for an imminent policy revolution (both
racially and in terms of a redefinition of war aims) and c) labor to manage and benefit from the
expectation that news of emancipation would or might find its way to the public before the
Union armies won the military victory (Holzer 2012, 36). Lincoln actively attempted to mobilize,
orchestrate, and consolidate public opinion, and while not everyone within the Union was
supportive, I believe that he clearly demonstrated strong political leadership.
In terms of good judgment, Lincoln was able to see the problem that slavery presented in
the war, seeing it for what it was, not what he wanted it to be. He of course wanted the problem
to go away through gradual, compensated emancipation, but as the war for the Union continued
to get worse, he changed the way in which to solve the problem. In this sense, Lincoln was a
strong risk assessor, meaning that he was able to weigh different outcomes of potential decisions
and he was extremely intentional with how he conceived of and announced his plans to issue the
Emancipation Proclamation. Holzer writes that, “by confiding, cautioning, clarifying, and
caviling, but most of all by waiting, an adroit Lincoln set the stage for the proclamation’s
inevitability and surprisingly warm reception. Seeming alternatively to be inconsistent, harsh,
humble, and ruthless, Lincoln was more accurately patient, wise, prescient, and practical” (2012,
70). Throughout the ten months of the development and issuing of the proclamation, Lincoln was
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extremely watchful, considering both what was going on within the war and monitoring public
opinion surrounding emancipation, demonstrating good judgment.
From this analysis of Lincoln’s character concerning his decision to issue the
Emancipation Proclamation, I believe that it can be concluded that Lincoln’s character can be a
strong explanatory factor for the success of the decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.
One can see that Lincoln’s high levels of both ambition and integrity played the largest roles in
the success of the decision, which then led to strong political leadership and good judgment.
Analysis Using the Strategic Resources Framework
I will next analyze Lincoln’s ability to strategically bargain and persuade using the
resources around him to determine whether this can also explain the success of the Emancipation
Proclamation. The first element within this theory is vantage points, which are how a president
uses the powers that are built into the Constitution. Lincoln not only used the presidential powers
outlined within the Constitution as commander in chief, he redefined the powers enumerated
within the Constitution to possess more power than any president before him had done. Issuing
the Emancipation Proclamation, for Lincoln, was a military necessity and warranted by
emergency power. The proclamation states, “And upon this act, warranted by the Constitution,
upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of
Almighty God” (Donald 1995, 407). Lincoln had grappled with the question of how far his
presidential powers could reach and he believed that an executive order of emancipation would
be beyond the powers of the president, except if the order were issued as a furtherance of the
executive’s war powers (Brewster 2014, 59). Therefore, in terms of vantage points, it is clear that
Lincoln not only used the presidential powers that he had, but that he even went beyond those
powers enumerated within the Constitution. While some may argue that Lincoln reached too far
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and misinterpreted and abused his presidential authority, others believe that the Union would not
have won the war without Lincoln’s expansion of his presidential powers and his issuance of the
Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln’s resolve to pass the Emancipation Proclamation regardless
of his cabinet member’s opinions doesn’t indicate use of direct persuasive ability, however none
of the dissenting members of the cabinet questioned Lincoln’s authority as a commander-in-chief
to issue the proclamation, so indirectly it could be argued that Lincoln persuaded his cabinet to
understand his constitutional rationale.
The only group that Lincoln tried to openly persuade concerning emancipation was
blacks. Prior to issuing the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln met with a group of freed blacks
in an attempt to bargain with them about gradual and compensated emancipation. Although he
was unsuccessful, it was an attempt to persuade a specific sector of society of his plans.
Strategically, Lincoln was quite adept at anticipating what his opponents were thinking and,
while waiting for a Union victory, he tried to prepare different sectors of society for possible
emancipation. His bargaining strategy was not overt, as he adopted a strategy more composed of
indirect bargaining and subtle persuasion, but one could argue that while not noticeably
successful, Lincoln’s strategy allowed him to prepare the country as best he could for
emancipation.
The second element within this framework is individual sense of power, which includes
how a president views how necessary power is in achieving their aims. Concerning this element,
it doesn’t seem that Lincoln strove to amass power or even that he viewed power as necessarily
valuable in achieving his aims. Burlingame writes that, “Lincoln did not burn with a desire to
wield power, but his keen sense of responsibility led him to perform his duties conscientiously,
onerous though he found them to be” (2008, 287). He used and expanded his power, but didn’t
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view it as essential to his success. Also included within the element of sense of one’s power is
the understanding of the power that others have and Lincoln was able to understand his power in
relation to others, especially concerning Congress. Lincoln, in his understanding of power,
believed that the individuals in Congress did not have the constitutional power that he did to
issue an emancipation proclamation. He felt that because he was commander-in-chief, he had
certain emergency war powers that superseded the powers that Congress possessed.
These two elements of vantage points and sense of one’s power then influence a
president’s professional reputation and public prestige. Professional reputation consists of the
opinions of the president from the “Washington” community, thus it is important to gauge how
individuals around a president believe how politically astute the president is in using their
presidential powers. As mentioned previously, when Lincoln told the cabinet about his decision
to issue an emancipation proclamation, he didn’t ask for or even want their opinions. Most of the
cabinet was shocked when Lincoln told them of his plans, not that they thought that Lincoln was
abusing his presidential authority, but just on the nature of what he was planning to do. Also, the
opinions of the Washington community didn’t seem to be a factor in Lincoln’s decision-making,
as he knew that issuing the proclamation would be controversial regardless of what his advisors
and individuals within his administration would think. Despite the fact that Lincoln tried to
prepare different sectors of society for emancipation, including those within the Washington
community, whether he was successful or not concerning that preparation didn’t seem to matter
to him. Lincoln also made choices that were designed to protect his professional reputation,
especially in regards to what he included within the Emancipation Proclamation. He rooted the
Emancipation Proclamation in constitutional authority and military necessity, and this protected
him from the Washington community criticism that he was abusing his presidential authority.
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Public prestige can be seen in how supportive the public is of the president. Concerning
the Emancipation Proclamation, there were some skeptics within the public that didn’t believe
that Lincoln actually intended to go through with signing the Emancipation Proclamation after
his announcement in September (Goodwin 2005, 497). Perhaps the most telling example of
public opinion can be shown from the 1862-midterm elections. Lincoln announced his intent to
issue the Emancipation Proclamation in late September and midterm elections were in early
November. Combined with the continued inaction by General McClellan and the Union army
and the resentment by conservatives concerning the Emancipation Proclamation, the election
results were a huge loss for the Lincoln administration and the Republican Party (Goodwin 2005,
485). The Republicans still held a small majority in Congress, but “Peace Democrats” made
large gains in Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana (Goodwin 2005). Even
Lincoln’s own home district elected the Democratic candidate over the Republican one and the
New York Times concluded that the elections amounted to a “vote of want of confidence” in the
President (Donald 1995, 383). The Republican Party had several different explanations for this
political rebuttal, including the administration’s policy of arbitrary arrests and the “ill-success of
the war” due to Lincoln’s military decisions (Donald 1995). It wasn’t only the issue of the
Emancipation Proclamation that prompted voters to reject Lincoln and the Republican Party, but
it is clear that it was a factor in the 1862 election losses, so public opinion during this time of
Lincoln’s presidency was not at its highest.
Professional reputation and public prestige both do not seem to have been important
factors in Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation. And in terms of these
factors influencing the ability to persuade, Lincoln didn’t have to use any persuasive ability
within this decision because he had conceived of and decided to issue the proclamation on his
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own, and didn’t feel the need to try and persuade those in his cabinet to agree with him. The
views of the public and of the Washington community were quite divided during this time and
according to the theoretical framework, it is essential for a president to have strong professional
reputation and high public prestige in order to gain political power and make successful
decisions. However, these two factors were not evident in Lincoln’s decision-making
surrounding the Emancipation Proclamation, therefore I believe that most of the strategic action
framework cannot help in explaining the success of the Emancipation Proclamation.
Conclusion
In this particular case, I believe that the character framework is more useful in terms of
understanding why Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation was a successful
decision. It is evident that Lincoln’s decision to issue the proclamation was largely his own, and
he internalized much of his thought process and rationale. For most of the spring and summer of
1862, Lincoln told very few individuals of his plan, and once he told those individuals of his
plans to issue the proclamation, he had already made up his mind and was unwilling to change it.
The character theoretical framework better captures the true essence of the decision, in that it
was Lincoln’s decision and his decision alone. There were situational factors that led him to
make that decision, but I believe I have shown it to be evident that his character was a large
factor in the success of the decision. The strategic action framework revolves around how a
president bargains and persuades those around him in order to make successful decisions, but
because this particular decision was such a solitary one, it is unable to provide a helpful
theoretical explanation for the success of the Emancipation Proclamation.
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CHAPTER 6: THE MANAGEMENT OF GENERAL McCLELLAN
The events of the Civil War presented specific military constraints and challenges that
any president would find daunting, regardless of individual military experience. Lincoln himself
had little military experience, only serving as a captain in the Blackhawk War for several months
and, as president, he was tasked with making extremely difficult military and strategic decisions.
Possibly due to his lack of military experience, as commander in chief Lincoln struggled to
appoint effective military leaders. Historian Ronald White writes that,
Lincoln quickly learned that his own military leaders were often the greatest obstacles to military
policy. The professional military leaders, almost all graduates of West Point, were trained for the
battlefield. Used to operating within a chain of command that did not include political leaders
and certainly not the president, many did not take kindly to Lincoln’s growing involvement with
in what they saw as their field of expertise. As Lincoln would become more and more a hands-on
commander in chief, tensions with some of his military leaders would grow (2008, 443).
Throughout the Civil War the Union army had a number of leadership changes and it wasn’t
until Lincoln appointed General Ulysses Grant in early 1864 that the Union army was
significantly more successful. Arguably one of the most problematic commanders of the Union
army was General George B. McClellan. McClellan, a West Point graduate from a Democratic,
wealthy family in Philadelphia, had had previous military experience in the Mexican War and
was seen by many as a hero and a charismatic leader (White 2008). Despite the admiration that
his soldiers and much of the country had for him and his abilities, militarily McClellan held
some significant faults, being best known for his over-cautiousness and military “paralysis”
while in the field. Throughout the majority of 1862 when McClellan was in command, Lincoln
became frustrated with McClellan’s defiant behavior and his numerous excuses for refusing to
advance his army, however Lincoln kept him in his position (as both General in Chief and
commander of the Army of the Potomac) (McPherson 1988, 365). Many Union battle failures or
missed opportunities can be attributed to McClellan’s hesitations and excuses, and it is important
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to understand why Lincoln didn’t remove McClellan from command sooner and attempt to put
someone in command that would give the Union army a better chance of success.
Lincoln’s Failure with General McClellan: A Narrative
As mentioned previously, Lincoln did not have a strong background in military
experience and, as president, he delegated much of the military tasks and strategic planning to
his General in Chief Winfield Scott (White 2009, 437). Prior to the Battle of Bull Run in July
1861, Lincoln took a passive stance toward his role as commander in chief, however, following
the humiliating Union defeat at Bull Run, Lincoln felt he could no longer defer to the opinions of
his generals and other senior military officers. White writes that, “After the humiliating defeat,
Lincoln turned his full attention to the military strategy that would carry out his national policy.
Although he would, at times, vacillate between deference and decision with his new military
leaders, as summer turned into fall he began to assume responsibilities that had never been
wielded before by an American president. By early 1862, he would become a hands-on
commander in chief” (438).
Immediately following the Battle of Bull Run, Lincoln replaced General Irvin McDowell,
who had been commanding the Union army, with General McClellan and placed McClellan in
command of the Union Army defending Washington, called the Army of the Potomac.
McClellan had been involved in some of the only successes that the Union had had thus far in the
war, winning several small battles in western Virginia. Lincoln recognized that the Union needed
a leader that could inspire the troops and take direct and aggressive action against Confederate
forces (White 2009). Goodwin writes that, “Lincoln hoped that between [Winfield] Scott’s
seasoned wisdom as general-in-chief and McClellan’s vitality and force, he would finally have a
powerfully effective team” (2008, 378). Upon naming him commander, Lincoln asked
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McClellan present to him a strategic plan that he believed would help to win the war.
McClellan’s main strategy would involve the training of an army of around 270,000 men whose
main goal was to capture Richmond and then move on to occupy other major Southern cities
such as New Orleans (McPherson 2008, 45). From the outset of McClellan’s promotion,
McClellan tried to undermine the authority of General in Chief Winfield Scott, and Lincoln spent
much of the fall of 1861 trying to mediate the conflict between the two (White 2009). McClellan
viewed Scott as an obstacle to his ambition and his strategic plans, and within the first two weeks
of his assumption of the command of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan questioned Scott’s
judgment in terms of military reinforcements to Washington (Goodwin 2005, 378). In addition to
McClellan’s disrespect of Scott, he also was, privately, quite disrespectful of Lincoln. After
Lincoln ordered McClellan to retract a disrespectful letter he had sent to General in Chief Scott,
McClellan wrote to his wife that, “The Presdt is an idiot . . . nothing more than a well meaning
baboon” (White 2009, 447). Throughout the fall of 1861, Lincoln spent more time with
McClellan than any of his other generals, as White writes, “It was as if he saw potential
greatness in this young man and hoped that he could nurture his abilities. Lincoln encouraged
him and tried to reason with him. McClellan, for his part, was never able to take advantage of the
leadership and the insight that the president was only too willing to offer” (White 2009, 447).
The conflict between General Scott and General McClellan came to a climax at the end
of September when Scott complained to Lincoln that he was always the last person to know of
McClellan’s plans (White 2009). At this point, Lincoln had been dealing with the conflict
between the two military commanders for over two months and he was fed up with their antics.
General Scott, a man in his early 70s, was a well-respected general who had devoted himself to a
life of service, but, militarily, he represented the past, and Lincoln recognized that McClellan

81
represented the future (White 2009). General Scott, feeling that his efforts to work with
McClellan were futile, submitted his resignation, citing “reasons of health”, effective October
31st. On November 1, 1861, Lincoln appointed the thirty-four year old McClellan to General in
Chief of the United States Army, the youngest man to have had this position (McPherson 2008,
51). In addition to this title, McClellan still retained his title as commander of the Army of the
Potomac. Not all within Washington were happy with this decision and there were several
Congressional leaders that were particularly upset with McClellan, especially following his
October defeat at Ball’s Bluff, where Colonel Edward Baker, a close friend of Lincoln’s and
other Republicans, was killed. They also believed that the Union troops were largely stagnant
and inactive. Despite these frustrations Lincoln defended McClellan and his decision to appoint
him to General in Chief (Goodwin 2005, 382). By this time, the heroic aura and admiration of
McClellan was fading, as not just politicians, but newspaper journalists and ordinary citizens,
started to question McClellan’s capacity to lead his troops (White 2008). Lincoln wanted to
continue to support McClellan, but he was anxious and impatient for McClellan to move his
army forward (White 2008, 457).
In late December of 1861, McClellan fell dangerously ill with typhoid fever and during
the following weeks, Lincoln’s spirit concerning the war wavered. Making matters worse, the
Committee on the Conduct of the War questioned Lincoln’s military leadership and in his choice
of General McClellan. The Committee on the Conduct of the War (also called the Joint
Committee on the Conduct of the War), was formed in early December by veteran congressman
who were determined to exercise greater congressional oversight over the war, especially
following the Union defeat at Ball’s Bluff and Lincoln’s firing of General Frémont (White 2008,
460). Historian Bruce Tap writes that, “Dissatisfied with the state of the war, less confident in
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Lincoln, and convinced that treason lurked within the innermost circles of the North's military
establishment, Congress moved quickly to establish a special joint committee to investigate
Northern military setbacks and to reinvigorate the war effort” (2002). Essentially the committee
was authorized to explore all that was happening within military affairs. It was a committee that
was made of up seven individuals, of which five ended up being Republicans (White 2008).
Interestingly, none of the members of the committee had any substantial military experience, and
most of them were very suspicious of West Point graduates and military professionals in general
(Tap 2002). Lincoln gave the members easy access to both himself and the War Department,
knowing that even when the committee could be excessive at times, they could be used to
support his own positions as commander in chief (White 2008, 460).
At the outset, the Committee was quick to denounce McClellan and they were frustrated
with Lincoln for keeping him in command. Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio told Lincoln that,
“You are murdering your country by inches in consequence of the inactivity of the military and
want of a distinct policy in regard to slavery” (Perret 2004, 113). Some members of the
committee wanted Lincoln to remove McClellan from command and Lincoln rejected that
suggestion, citing that “it is my duty to defer to General McClellan” (Perret 2004). Starting in the
new year of 1862, many within Congress were frustrated with McClellan’s announcement that
all was “quiet on the Potomac” as they viewed it as another example of his procrastination
(White 2009, 470). Still Lincoln continued to defend McClellan. When confronted by the
increasingly vehement criticism of McClellan’s tardiness in attacking the Confederates, Lincoln
responded that, ‘there was probably but one man in the country more anxious for a battle than
himself, and that man was McClellan . . . He insisted that ‘McClellan is not a traitor; his
difficulty is that he always prefers to-morrow to to-day. He is never ready to move. I think the
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immense importance of the interests at stake affects him thus. In this he is very much like
myself.’” (Burlingame 2008, 290).
Another challenge that Lincoln was facing at this time in regards to the war was his
Secretary of War Simon Cameron. By the end of 1861, Cameron was proving to be the most
problematic member of Lincoln’s cabinet (White 2008, 460). Cameron perhaps had the most
difficult position of all of the cabinet members, as he was expected to support a large, constantly
growing army, yet he had such a small staff within the War Department (White 2008). As the
army grew in numbers, Cameron became tense and ineffective, quickly losing control of his own
department. After a considerable period of time, Lincoln responded giving Cameron a new
position as the minister to Russia, however there were individuals who believed that Lincoln
should have fired or relocated Cameron earlier. White writes that, “Lincoln took his time when it
came to people . . .Lincoln’s loyalty was a strong character trait that sometimes overrode
judgment” (2008, 462). One can see a consistency within Lincoln’s character here, in that
Lincoln dealt with Cameron in the same way that he would deal with McClellan, offering his
unwavering support and encouragement until it was clear that a change must be made. In early
January of 1862 Lincoln chose Edwin Stanton to replace Cameron, an individual who quickly
assumed total control of his department and imposed new order and leadership within the War
Department (White 2008).
As January was coming to an end and still McClellan had not made any military progress,
Lincoln could wait no longer and he issued the President’s General Order No. 1 on January 27th.
It stated that, “ Ordered, that on the 22nd day of February 1862, be the day for a general
movement of the Land and Naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces” (Perret
2004, 123). This was quite a interesting order, as four days later Lincoln issued the President’s
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Special War Order Number One in which he stated to McClellan that the immediate object
should be the “seizing and occupying” of Manassas Junction, the details of which were to be “at
the discretion of the general-in-chief” (White 2009, 471). Following this order, McClellan asked
for permission to submit objections to Lincoln’s plan and propose his own, which Lincoln
allowed (McPherson 2008). McClellan’s plan, called the Urbana Plan, proposed to take the
Army of the Potomac down the Potomac River and set up a secure base to launch a fifty-mile
ground campaign to the Confederate capital at Richmond (McPherson 2008). Lincoln was
skeptical of McClellan’s plan and wasn’t convinced of its chances of success. He thought that the
plan would involve extra time and money and that his own plan offered a safer retreat if needed.
However he tentatively agreed on the plan anyway, despite deep reservations, as his respect for
military professionals still outweighed his knowledge about military strategy (White 2009, 472).
In late February tragedy struck the White House, as Lincoln’s son Willie, only eleven
years old, died of typhoid fever. Lincoln was devastated, and while he fiercely engaged himself
in his work, he suffered a profound sense of loss (Goodwin 2005, 422). Dealing with grief,
Lincoln left the ultimate decision of McClellan’s proposed plan to the general’s senior division
commanders, who voted 8-4 in favor of McClellan’s plan (Perret 2004, 125). Unfortunately
McClellan’s plan failed, as an attempt to advance Union boats across the Potomac were not able
to pass through a lock in the canal, stalling the Union’s ability to move forward (Perret 2004). It
can be argued whether Lincoln should have rejected the majority vote by the division
commanders to allow McClellan to move forward with his plan, but Lincoln assented to the
majority opinion against his better judgment (White 2009). If Lincoln would have rejected
McClellan’s Urbana Plan it could have provoked McClellan’s resignation, demoralization of the
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Union Army, and further military delay, so despite Lincoln’s concerns, McClellan remained in
control (McPherson 2008, 78).
As February turned to March, Lincoln became more frustrated with McClellan and he
met with the Joint Committee on the Conduct of War on March 3. Lincoln was aware of the buzz
around Washington that McClellan was secretly a Confederate sympathizer, as he had received
numerous letters from people accusing McClellan of treason. In the meeting several members of
the committee once again advised Lincoln to remove McClellan from command. Senator Wade
from Ohio said that anybody would be better in command than McClellan and Lincoln told him,
“Wade, anybody will do for you, but not for me. I must have somebody” (McPherson 2008, 77).
At the time, the committee had two possible candidates in mind, Irvin McDowell and John
Frémont, but Lincoln believed that these generals carried too much negative baggage from
previous battle failures. Already at this time, Lincoln had been considering the removal of
McClellan, but it seems that he felt trapped, as there was nobody that he felt confident with in
replacing him.
Lincoln, in order to put some pressure on McClellan, issued President’s War Order No.
2, which essentially organized the army into five corps, and, much to McClellan’s anger, Lincoln
personally selected the commander of each of the corps (Perret 2004, 127). He also issued
President’s General Order No. 3, which called for the Army of the Potomac to advance south on
March 18th (Perret 2004). Continued pressure by Secretary of War Stanton and the Committee on
the Conduct of War moved Lincoln into relieving McClellan of his command, and on March 11th
Lincoln decided to relieve McClellan of his command as General in Chief, but kept him still in
charge of the Army of the Potomac (Thomas 2008, 308). Lincoln cited reasons that, as
commander of the Army of the Potomac about to take the field, McClellan could no longer “do it
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all” (McPherson 2008, 79). Interestingly, Lincoln, knowing no one fit for supreme command,
undertook military control as General in Chief himself, aided by Secretary Stanton and veteran
General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, both of whom proved to be of little help (Thomas 2008, 308).
Throughout the spring and summer of 1862, McClellan continued to give excuses for not
advancing on Confederate forces. He griped about bridges needing to be built, bad roads, and a
need for the reorganization of regiments (Goodwin 2008, 443). In early April, McClellan began
his Peninsula Campaign, pushing forward towards Yorktown. McClellan and the Potomac Army
enjoyed a manpower advantage of four to one (Perret 2004). McClellan overestimated the
strength and numbers of the Confederate forces and stalled, despite having a clear opening for an
attack (Thomas 2008, 316). While McClellan dawdled, the Confederate forces ramped up their
reinforcements. In early May, when McClellan was finally ready to advance on Yorktown,
having run out of excuses of needing more men and asking for specific types of weaponry, he
discovered that the Confederates had evacuated their positions, a humiliation for him and his
army (Thomas 2008). In late June to early July, a series of battles, named the Seven Days Battles
was waged between General McClellan and General Robert E. Lee. On the second day, Lee won
a costly victory that greatly affected McClellan, who wrote to Secretary Stanton, “Have had a
terrible contest. Attacked by greatly superior numbers from all directions on this side . . .Had I
20,000 fresh and good troops, we would be sure of a splendid victory tomorrow” (Thomas 2008,
326). McClellan was not so outnumbered in this battle outnumbering Confederate troops three to
one on the south side of the river, yet he was still unable to advance towards Richmond (Thomas
2008). He failed to take responsibility for the failure saying that, “I have lost this battle because
my force was too small. I again repeat that I am not responsible for this” (Goodwin 2008,443).
Throughout the summer of 1862, Lincoln was still in support of McClellan, possibly because he

87
wanted to cling to some type of military stability or possibly he still believed in McClellan’s
potential, visiting him in multiple different field locations and continuing to send reinforcements
when asked. However, as Union forces continued to suffer defeat after defeat throughout the
summer, Lincoln felt unsure of how to proceed (Goodwin 2008).
Lincoln’s cabinet, following the Union defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run in late
August 1862, began to vigorously pursue a way to oust McClellan (Goodwin 2008, 478).
Stanton, Chase, Smith, Welles, and Bates all signed a protest document that would impress upon
Lincoln that McClellan must be dismissed. Lincoln was deeply troubled by the knowledge that
his cabinet so strongly opposed him, however he reasoned that, “McClellan knows this whole
ground and can be trusted to act on the defensive” maintaining that there was “no better
organizer” (Goodwin 2008, 479). The small victory that was achieved from the Battle of
Antietam on September 17th was the military success that Lincoln needed to issue the
Emancipation Proclamation, but it was not the decisive victory it could have been. McClellan,
following the immediate victory, had failed to pursue the retreating Confederate forces, and he
allowed them to cross the Potomac into Virginia, where they would have the location and the
resources to regroup and replenish (Goodwin 2008, 481).
On October 1st, Lincoln went to Sharpsburg to visit McClellan to urge him to pursue the
Confederate forces. Lincoln chided McClellan concerning his overcautiousness, and upon
returning to Washington he ordered McClellan to cross the Potomac and attack (Thomas 2008,
345). McClellan denied to Lincoln that he was overcautious, citing that there was a lack of
supplies, a lack of shoes, and tired horses. This final excuse irritated Lincoln immensely, who
asked him, “Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the
battle of Antietam that fatigue anything?” (Goodwin 2008, 485). Lincoln concluded that if
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McClellan did not mobilize in the pursuit of Lee’s troops by the end of October, he would be
relieved from duty.
Finally, on November 11th, a day after Lincoln and the Republicans suffered a heavy
defeat in the midterm elections, Lincoln relieved McClellan as commander of the Army of the
Potomac. Lincoln told his secretary John Hay that, “I began to fear he was playing false- that he
did not want to hurt the enemy. I saw how he could intercept the enemy on the way to
Richmond. I determined to make the test. If he let them get away, I would remove him. He did so
& I relieved him” (Goodwin 2008, 485). It seemed that Lincoln felt that he had reached the end
of his rope with McClellan, however another possible, more strategic reason, was that Lincoln
only kept McClellan in his post for as long as he did in the hopes that having a Democratic
general at the head of the army would help in the polls. It did not, and this combined with
McClellan’s poor handlings of the war effort after Antietam doomed him (Masur 2012). This is
only a speculation of Masur, however it certainly is a plausible explanation. While Lincoln
would have several consecutive failures of military leaders following McClellan, he would
eventually promote General Ulysses Grant to be commander of the Union Army, i.e. General in
Chief, in March 1864, who would ultimately help the Union win the war. It is important to
understand why Lincoln kept McClellan in command for so long, as there were numerous Union
defeats and failures due to inaction that can be attributed to McClellan and that severely
jeopardized the Union’s ability to win the war.
Analysis Using the Character Framework
In looking at the failure of Lincoln to manage General McClellan, can one identify
specific elements of his character, i.e. ambition, relatedness, integrity and emotional intelligence
that influenced or affected his failed decision to keep McClellan in command? One could also

89
say it demonstrates a lack of a decision, at least until Lincoln ultimately removes McClellan from
command in November of 1862.What makes this case interesting is the fact that, unlike the
Emancipation Proclamation, this decision is more of a series of small decisions, not one big
decision. Concerning Lincoln’s role as commander in chief, there are several scholars that
believe that Lincoln was a hands-on commander in chief, who was extremely active in his
engagement with the army (McPherson 2008; Burlingame 2008; White 2008). McPherson writes
that, “At all levels of policy, strategy, and operations, however, Lincoln was a hands-on
commander in chief who persisted through a terrible ordeal of defeats and disappointments to
final triumph- and tragedy-at the end” (2008, 8). And Burlingame echoes that sentiment, writing
that, “Until time and trial brought forth the man he needed, the very force of circumstances
obliged him to plan grand strategy himself. And his plans were invariably sound-failure came
from faulty execution by his generals. In averting disaster until he found a general he could trust,
Lincoln became a master of the art of war” (2008, 332). These are scholars that believe that
Lincoln was an extremely engaged and adept military leader, but that the execution by his
generals, especially McClellan, was a failure. Yet the question remains, if Lincoln was such a
hands-on, capable commander then why didn’t’ he remove McClellan from command earlier?
From my initial assessment, I believe that the character theoretical framework may not be
as useful in understanding this decision, however a closer analysis may indicate otherwise. In
first looking at ambition, it seems evident that ambition did not play a strong role within
Lincoln’s decisions concerning McClellan. Ambition encompasses the motivational element that
individuals possess and the set of skills they use in the pursuit of their goals, including enacting
transformational policy, demonstrating strong inner drive and self-initiative, and being highly
active and engaged. If one looks to when Lincoln promoted McClellan, it doesn’t seem to be for
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Lincoln’s own ambitious reasons of creating a historical legacy. Although one could argue that
Lincoln did hope that McClellan would be a transformational figure that would help to breathe
new life into the Union army and make it a more successful force against the Confederacy.
Facing the defeat at Bull Run, Lincoln recognized the need for a new commanding general and
he promoted McClellan based upon his small successes in western Virginia, and the hope that
McClellan would bring vitality to the Union army. The only part of ambition that is clearly
evident within Lincoln’s decisions concerning McClellan is that he was highly involved and
engaged in his communications with him. Lincoln was a frequent visitor to McClellan’s
headquarters within Washington, and he also visited McClellan and his soldiers in the field
numerous times (White 2009). White writes that, “Over the next months [in the fall of 1861],
Lincoln would spend far more time with McClellan than any of his generals” (2008, 447).
Lincoln sought out McClellan for military news and strategy, and while McClellan found these
visits from the president an annoyance, Lincoln actually used them to size up the general (White
2009, 446). Lincoln was ambitious in keeping up with McClellan, however I don’t believe that
ambition entered into Lincoln’s decision in terms of keeping McClellan in command and when
he removed him from command.
Concerning Lincoln’s integrity in the failure of his management of General McClellan, I
believe this trait is not very relevant within the decision. A possible explanation for this is the
case involves a decision about means, not ends or values, and, because integrity deals with
personal ideals and values, it is not as relevant. Lincoln’s personal ideals and values did not seem
to play a part in his decisions concerning McClellan. One of the characteristics of integrity is that
a president is willing to stick their convictions despite ultimate loss. If one sees McClellan as a
sort of “conviction” of Lincoln’s, then one could argue that Lincoln stuck with McClellan even
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despite loss and he kept in command despite others telling him not too. Despite this possible
rationale, I don’t believe that there is enough strong evidence to indicate the element of integrity
within this decision.
In considering relatedness, one could argue that a lack of relatedness had an effect on
Lincoln’s failure to manage General McClellan. One of the characteristics of relatedness is the
way in which a president treats his staff and advisers. While Lincoln never overtly mistreated
those around him, including military leaders and his cabinet, he ignored numerous requests from
both his cabinet and the Committee on the Conduct of War to remove General McClellan from
command. Several members of the cabinet had signed a petition asking for Lincoln to fire
McClellan and members on the Committee on the Conduct of War vehemently attacked
McClellan and his military tactics and demanded his removal. Senator Fessenden said about
Lincoln not removing McClellan that, “It is no longer doubtful that General McClellan is utterly
unfit for his position . . .And yet the President will keep him in command, and leave our destiny
in his hands . . .Well it cannot be helped. We went for a rail-splitter and we have got one”
(Thomas 2008, 308). Despite these criticisms, Lincoln still would not remove McClellan from
command until at least several months after multiple complaints. It is likely that many within the
cabinet and the war committee felt disrespected by Lincoln’s inability to take their opinions into
consideration. Lincoln seemed to have included many individuals within his military sphere, and
while he understood why some of these individuals would want McClellan removed, he felt that
he had no other option than to keep McClellan in command. As mentioned earlier, Lincoln
identified with McClellan and saw great potential in him, so he spent a lot of his energy and time
trying to harness that potential. Lincoln so badly wanted to be able to relate to McClellan and he
wanted him to be successful, but McClellan was largely unreceptive and wanted to do things his
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own way, much to the disappointment of Lincoln. In this sense, I believe that one could say
Lincoln demonstrated too much relatedness towards McClellan, in that his empathy and his
desire to be able to relate to McClellan caused a lack of relatedness with the rest of his cabinet.
Concerning the element of emotional intelligence, I believe that Lincoln’s lack of
emotional intelligence did play a role in the failure to manage General McClellan. To reiterate,
emotional intelligence involves the ability of a president to not let negative feelings or personal
hardships affect the way that a president does their job. The death of Willie Lincoln was
devastating for Lincoln, and it does seem to have had an effect on Lincoln’s management of
McClellan. Lincoln, dealing with grief following Willie’s death in late February of 1862,
allowed a council of division commanders to have a final vote on McClellan’s Urbana plan. This
council was mostly made up of generals that McClellan himself had appointed, so not
surprisingly they voted in favor of McClellan’s plan (Perret 2004). Lincoln himself had
skeptically agreed with this plan, but he had developed his own, less risky and less costly plan,
that could also have been implemented. It is impossible to know if Lincoln’s plan would have
fared better than McClellan’s or if McClellan’s behavior and “paralysis” would have thwarted
both plans, but it is evident that Lincoln, dealing with grief, was unable to manage McClellan
during his time of mourning and let others around him make important military decisions. The
way that Lincoln dealt with this is not necessarily a personal flaw, as many people would have a
hard time doing their job after the death of their child and it is certainly understandable why
Lincoln acted in the way that he did, but I do believe that this event certainly affected Lincoln’s
behavior concerning McClellan.
From my conclusions, ambition and integrity appear to not have played a role in this
failed decision, but a lack of relatedness and emotional intelligence did seem to affect Lincoln’s
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decision. Next I turn to the element of judgment, which involves a president’s ability to match
solutions to circumstances, in that he can identify a problem, see it for what it is, and devise an
appropriate solution. Presidents employing good judgment are curious and seek out information
regarding how to solve problems and are realistic risk assessors. In looking at judgment, Lincoln
employed good judgment in that he sought out information regarding how to deal with military
problems. White writes that, “As commander in chief, Lincoln understood that he faced a steep
learning curve. Yet his whole adult life had consisted of self-education, and he welcomed the
challenge. Just as he had become a self-taught lawyer in rural Illinois, he now set out to teach
himself military theory and strategy” (2008, 441). Lincoln seemingly was able to assess the risk
of different military plans of both his own and his generals, but yet he also allowed McClellan to
pursue his own plans instead of following the plans that he himself had made. Here one can
identify a contradiction in the fact that Lincoln, following the Battle of Bull Run, wanted to no
longer defer to his generals and military advisers, yet he deferred numerous times to the
command of General McClellan. It seemed that his rationale was that the military professionals
knew best, but Lincoln had been learning military strategy and spending the majority of his time
in the War Department, so he had acquired quite a bit of knowledge of military tactics and
strategy by this time.
Concerning his political leadership, Lincoln didn’t need to mobilize, orchestrate, and
consolidate the public, as military strategic issues are generally handled by the political elite, but
nonetheless political leadership was largely absent in this decision. Another element of political
leadership is a president’s use of their political skills to strengthen political relationships and I
believe that Lincoln was clearly lacking in leadership in this category. Many of his political
relationships suffered because of his failure to manage McClellan and his other generals. So I
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believe that there is enough evidence to conclude that a lack of both good judgment and political
leadership did have an effect that can help to provide a plausible rationale for Lincoln’s failed
decision.
Analysis of Strategic Action Framework
Turning to the strategic action framework it will be important to answer the question: is it
evident that a lack of a strategic use of resources through persuasion and bargaining led to the
failure of Lincoln’s ability to manage McClellan? My initial assessment is that the framework
will, in part, be able to help explain why Lincoln’s decisions regarding General McClellan were
a failure. In first looking at vantage points, the way that a president uses the powers that are built
into the Constitution, Lincoln did take his constitutional role as the commander in chief
seriously. He did utilize his powers to make leadership appointments and issue war orders,
however he doesn’t bargain with others using these vantage points, and that is an area where I
think Lincoln failed. This demonstrates the limit of what orders can do, as Lincoln orders
McClellan to act but these orders can’t make McClellan take initiative in a enthusiastic and
vigorous way, which would seem to be necessary for one to enter into battle. Lincoln rarely tried
to bargain with others concerning McClellan and with McClellan himself, and while Lincoln
defended McClellan to all that wanted him relieved from command, he never tried to use his
status as commander in chief or his powers to bargain and this greatly affected Lincoln’s
professional reputation. Lincoln failed to recognize that letting McClellan defy his orders but
remain in command weakened his reputation, as those around him did not agree with his
decisions concerning the general. Concerning the element of an individual’s sense of power, I do
not find this element relevant within this decision. In this instance, I do not think that Lincoln
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necessarily viewed power as essential nor did he attempt to amass power in the hopes of better
managing McClellan.
Concerning the element of professional reputation, it seems quite evident that Lincoln
lacked a strong professional reputation in regards to his decisions concerning McClellan. As
evidenced from the narrative, there were many individuals within the Washington community
that believed that McClellan was not completely loyal to the Union and was not acting in good
faith. They also believed that Lincoln was inept in the handling of McClellan and they did not
respect the way that he was using his presidential powers as commander in chief. Secretary of
War Stanton was especially disenchanted with Lincoln’s behavior towards McClellan, and at one
point he was so agitated that he stated that, “he knew of no particular obligations he was under to
the President who had called him to a difficult position and imposed upon him labors and
responsibilities which no could carry . . . He could not and would not submit to a continuance of
this state of things” (Goodwin 2008, 477). Clearly this indicates a lack of respect of the way that
Lincoln was making decisions and there were many others besides Stanton that felt similarly.
Lincoln also did little to try and protect his professional reputation. He didn’t punish his friends
or reward his enemies, he simply let people think and say what they felt about McClellan and did
little to try and convince them otherwise.
Turning to public prestige, which is how favorable the Washington community thinks the
public is towards the president, Lincoln’s public prestige seems to not have been a factor in this
failed decision. As most military decisions are largely isolated within the political sphere, the
Washington community’s view of public opinion surrounding Lincoln as commander in chief is
not an important or evident factor within the decision. The only fact worth mentioning is the
1862-midterm elections in which Lincoln and the Republican Party lost a number of seats. While
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this is not direct evidence of low public prestige, the electorate did not view Lincoln’s handling
of military matters positively and Lincoln and his party paid the price for that in the polls.
From my analysis of the framework, Lincoln’s lack of the use of his vantage points and
his resulting low professional reputation affected his political power and his ability to persuade
those around him. Political power deals with how a president demonstrates control and authority
dealing with each specific decision that they face. They are able to persuade those around them
and have the ability to convince others to act in ways compatible with the president’s policy
needs. From the details within the narrative, Lincoln clearly did not protect his political power in
this instance. He wasn’t able to act authoritatively enough, as McClellan often disobeyed
Lincoln’s war orders and commands and Lincoln wasn’t able to convince or persuade his cabinet
and other individuals within Washington that McClellan should stay in command. A more
powerful Lincoln might have been able to persuade McClellan, however McClellan continued to
disobey Lincoln’s orders even after Lincoln relieves him from position as General in Chief. An
important point that can be understood from Neustadt is that Lincoln’s protection of his vantage
points would have given him clues to good policy, which would have been firing McClellan,
however Lincoln wasn’t able to protect his vantage points, showing that a lack of political power
can lead to bad policy.
As one can see, Lincoln does not act in the way that the framework suggests would lead
to a successful decision, and this can explain why the decision was a failure. If Lincoln had
successfully utilized his vantage points then his professional reputation would have been higher,
giving him greater political power and the ability to bargain, which potentially could have lead to
a more successful decision. This theoretical framework can’t explain why Lincoln made the
decisions that he did, but it can explain why it was a failure. If Lincoln had better used his
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authority to persuade and bargain with those around him, especially McClellan, perhaps the
outcome of the Union Army in the beginning years of the Civil War would have been different.
Conclusion
Both of the theoretical frameworks offer plausible explanations for why Lincoln’s
decisions concerning McClellan were failures. The character framework indicates that Lincoln’s
both lack of and excessive relatedness and a lack of good judgment can help to explain why there
was a failed decision and the strategic action framework indicates that lack of the use of vantage
points, low professional reputation and absence of political power help explain the failed
decision. Regarding both frameworks, Lincoln didn’t act in the way that the framework indicates
should lead to a successful decision. The two frameworks complement each other in terms of
explaining the decision, as the strategic action framework better explains why the decision was a
failure, and the character framework betters helps to explain why Lincoln made the failed
decisions that he did. Within the decision, one can see Lincoln’s streak of passivity that David
Donald mentions, as well as an element of stubbornness. Lincoln’s sense of personal loyalty to
those around him also overlaps with this element of stubbornness. Lincoln felt loyal to
McClellan and he was stubborn to relieve him of command because of his allegiance. Also, the
absence of integrity within this decision eliminated one of Lincoln’s strongest character
elements. In this particular situation, Lincoln’s integrity did not tell him what to do, unlike his
decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and this forced Lincoln to try and rationalize
his decision in other ways.
One of the most interesting elements that Lincoln demonstrates is his empathetic nature
towards McClellan. As mentioned earlier, there was something within Lincoln that made him
strongly identify with McClellan and this seemed to cloud his judgment in how he dealt with
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McClellan’s disobedience and disrespect. The problem was that Lincoln tried to relate to
McClellan, but McClellan disliked Lincoln and had no sympathy towards him. He insulted
Lincoln in letters to his wife and he didn’t respect Lincoln’s orders or commands, yet Lincoln
continued to try and build a functioning relationship. This can explain why Lincoln defended
McClellan in numerous instances while it seemed everybody else around him knew that
McClellan was unable to give the Union military success. One also saw that type of loyalty with
Lincoln’s former Secretary of War Simon Cameron. Lincoln was an individual that wanted to
give everyone the benefit of the doubt and he gave ample opportunities to those he felt loyal to.
These numerous factors, Lincoln’s stubbornness, empathetic nature, willingness to give the
benefit of the doubt, and sense of loyalty all affected the way that Lincoln handled McClellan.
These elements of character influenced the way in which he interacted with his advisers and
cabinet, and a poor professional reputation and the inability to persuade others can certainly help
to explain Lincoln’s failure. In the end, Lincoln did relieve McClellan of his command, but had
he better been able to manage McClellan and persuade those around Washington to trust in his
decisions, the Union might have had greater successes earlier on in the war and the Civil War
might have been a shorter war.
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CHAPTER 7: SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS
From the moment that Lincoln was inaugurated as the 16th president of the United States,
he was thrust into a tense world of military decision-making. The way in which he conceived of
his executive powers and made important military decisions largely defined his presidency and
one of the most prominent examples of this is Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
which he suspended both in 1861 and again in 1863. This paper will principally be examining
Lincoln’s decision to suspend habeas corpus in 1861. Similar to Lincoln’s decision to issue the
Emancipation Proclamation, his rationale of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was
largely out of military necessity. Author Brian McGinty writes that, “Lincoln’s decision to
suspend habeas corpus was not made in isolation. It was part of an overall strategy to resist the
Southern rebellion. It was a military, not a judicial, measure . . . He ordered the suspension of
habeas corpus pursuant to what he called the “war power,” and believed the suspension was as
necessary to the war effort as his orders sending troops into battle” (2011, 5). Despite this
rationale, there were individuals that believed that Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus was an
extreme violation of citizen’s civil liberties. Historian Mark Neely Jr. writes that, “The
Democratic depiction of Lincoln as a tyrant was to have more influence on history than it
merited, but like many political caricatures, it contained a certain element of truth” (210). In this
sense, one can understand Lincoln’s decision as a success, in that it was an emergency military
measure that allowed Lincoln to take action he believed to be necessary without the immediate
approval of Congress, or as a failure, in that it was an extreme violation of American’s civil
liberties.
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Lincoln’s Suspension of Habeas Corpus: The Narrative
Lincoln was inaugurated on March 4, 1861 and he would make the decision to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus only a little over a month later, on April 27th. No inauguration had
taken place in such turbulent times, as seven states had already seceded from the Union and
formed the Confederate States of America and there were rumors of threats of attacks of Lincoln
and on Washington (White 2009, 388). One of the immediate factors that is important to know is
that at the beginning of Lincoln’s presidency Congress was not yet in session. This is a factor
that served to both benefit and restrain Lincoln, as he had the freedom to act without limitations
from Congress, but he also didn’t believe that he could act alone (White 2009, 408). Congress
was not supposed to reconvene until the first Monday in December, which was a long eight
months away. It had also soon become apparent in the spring of 1861 that the conflict between
the North and the South had reached the point of no return, especially following the Union
surrender at Fort Sumter (McGinty 2011, 34).
Lincoln recognized that if the Union was to be more fully involved in the conflict, which
it was clear that they needed to at least have better defense, there needed to be a larger and more
organized militia. Lincoln conferred with his cabinet, military advisers, and members of
Congress following the surrender at Fort Sumter to decide what action to take. As of spring
1861, there were only sixteen thousand men in the army, most of who were stationed on the
Western frontier (McGinty 2011). Lincoln understood that the capital was extremely vulnerable
and he wanted to summon militia volunteers to help defend the city; a course of action with
which his advisers agreed upon (McGinty 2011, 39). Also within this meeting, the group of
Lincoln and his advisers discussed calling a special session of Congress due to the dire
circumstances that the Union was facing. In response to both of these issues, Lincoln issued a
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proclamation on April 15th for a special session of Congress to be convened on July 4, 1861 and
a call for an additional seventy-five thousand militiamen (McGinty 2011, 40). In addition to
these demands, he stated that, “the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will
probably be to re- possess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the
Union” (McGinty 2011, 40). Response to his proclamation was largely divided. In the North,
governors of Maine, Ohio, and Indiana all agreed to send troops, with Governor of Ohio William
Dennison assuring Lincoln that he would, “furnish the largest number you will receive” (White
2009, 413). Meanwhile, there were border states, such as Kentucky, that acted defiantly.
Kentucky governor Beriah Magoffin replied that, “Kentucky will furnish no troops for the
wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states” (White 2009, 413). Lincoln’s
proclamation also seemed to push Virginia over the edge, as they had been debating secession
for several weeks, but following this news, on April 17th, they joined the Confederacy (McGinty
2011, 41). The largest concern came from Massachusetts governor John Andrew, who was
willing to provide troops, but was wondering as to what route that should he send them, as they
would have to pass through Maryland, which was proving to be a volatile state (White 2009).
Maryland posed an interesting situation during the spring of 1861. It was a bit of an
anomaly in that it had strong cultural ties to the South, but had both strong pro-Union sentiment
and strong Southern sympathizers (McGinty 2011). Following the secession of Virginia, the only
railroad lines for supplies, communications, and troops to pass ran through Baltimore (Dueholm
2008, 48). Within Baltimore, there were numerous Confederate sympathizers who were greatly
upset that there would be Union troops passing through (Dueholm 2008). The reason that
Governor Andrew was so concerned about the route to send his troops was that the
Massachusetts regiment would have to pass through Baltimore where there was fear of riots and
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attacks on Union volunteer militias. These fears were confirmed, when, on April 19th, the Sixth
Massachusetts regiment reached Baltimore en route to defend Washington and were attacked by
a secessionist mob, where four soldiers and nine civilians were killed (Goodwin 2005, 352). The
mayor of Baltimore, George Brown, and the governor of Maryland, Thomas Hicks, made a
statement that same day, stating they would not comply with Lincoln’s request to send volunteer
militiamen. Governor Hicks stated that, “I am a Marylander. I love my State and I love the
Union, but I will suffer my right arm to be torn from my body before I will raise it to strike a
sister State” (McGinty 2011, 47). Mayor Brown also sent a coalition of delegates from Baltimore
to Washington on April 22nd to ask Lincoln that Union troops be kept not only out of just
Baltimore, but the whole state of Maryland (Goodwin 2005). Lincoln adamantly refused to
comply with this request. He stated that, “I must have troops to defend this Capital.
Geographically it lies surrounded by the soil of Maryland . . .Our men are not moles, and can’t
dig under the earth; they are not birds and can’t fly through the air. There is no way but to march
across, and that they must do” (Goodwin 2005, 352). Lincoln also summoned Governor Hicks
and Mayor Brown to the capital, and they met with General Winfield Scott and the cabinet.
Lincoln assured Brown and Hicks that he would do his best to move federal troops around
Baltimore rather than through it and that his sole purpose was to protect Washington, not attack
Maryland (McGinty 2011, 48).
Also on April 22nd, Governor Hicks called for a special session of the Maryland state
legislature to convene on April 26th (Neely 1991, 6). Many individuals, including Lincoln and his
cabinet, feared that the legislators would commence proceedings for a secession ordinance
(Neely 1991). Following this announcement, General Benjamin Butler, commander of the
Massachusetts regiments, and General in Chief Winfield Scott, had considered threatening the
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arrests of any “secession-minded Maryland politicians” in order to try and prohibit possible
secession (Neely 1991, 6). Lincoln did not think that that course of action would be justifiable, as
the Maryland legislators had a right to assemble and it was impossible to know what they would
decide and what actions they would take (McGinty 2011). Lincoln wrote to General Scott on
April 25th, ordering that, “I therefore conclude that it is only left to the commanding General to
watch, and await their action, which, if it shall be to arm their people against the United States,
he is to adopt the most prompt, and efficient means to counteract, even, if necessary, to the
bombardment of their cities— and in the extremest necessity, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus” (Neely 1991, 7). It is interesting to note, according to Sherrill Halbert, that even
in this most desperate situation, Lincoln hesitated to suspend habeas corpus, looking at the
bombardment of Maryland cities as preferable to the suspension of habeas corpus (1958, 99).
The situation within Maryland became even more intense, as Southern sympathizers in
Maryland began to cut telegraph wires and burn bridges in an attempt to cut off all
communication between the North and the capital (White 2009, 416). For days this rioting
continued, and Lincoln began to receive word that the mobs intended to destroy railroad tracks
between Annapolis and Philadelphia in order to prevent troops from reaching the capital
(Goodwin 2005, 354). Lincoln then made the controversial decision, writing to General Scott on
April 27th that, “You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the United
States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of the military line, which is now being used between
the City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington . . . you find resistance which renders it
necessary to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you, personally or through
an office in command at the point where the resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend the
writ” (Neely 1991, 8). In Lincoln’s words, General Scott had the power to arrest and detain any
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individuals, between Philadelphia and Washington, deemed dangerous to the public safety
(Goodwin 2005). Historian James Dueholm clarifies that, under the Constitution, the federal
government can unquestionably suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus if the public
safety requires it during times of rebellion. The issue was whether Congress or the president held
this power (2008, 47). Technically, from the document of the Constitution itself, the right to
suspend habeas corpus is located in Article I, which enumerates the powers of Congress and the
legislative branch, and therefore Congress had that power. Lincoln was reluctant to claim this
power for himself, but as Congress was not in session and were not able to suspend habeas
corpus themselves, he felt that he had to take direct action himself in the interest of the public.
Secretary of State Seward later claimed that he had urged a wavering Lincoln to order this,
convincing him that “perdition was the sure penalty of further hesitation” (McGinty 2011, 84;
Goodwin 2005, 355).
The test of the legality of the suspension of habeas corpus came about a month later,
when an individual named John Merryman was arrested in Cockeysville, Maryland on May 25,
1861 for treason, allegedly organizing the burning of bridges, and for drilling troops to aid the
secessionist movement against the U.S. government (White 2009, 416). Following his arrest,
Merryman’s attorney’s immediately petitioned the federal court in Baltimore to examine the
charges against Merryman under the writ of habeas corpus (White 2009). A legal concept
developed by common law in England, habeas corpus, Latin for “to have the body”, allowed for
a special judicial proceeding that enabled a person deprived of their liberty to obtain a prompt
determination as to the legality of their deprivation, essentially protecting innocent persons from
unlawful and illegal detention (McGinty 2011, 73). The federal judge who heard the case
happened to be Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, who also served as the circuit
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judge for the Fourth Circuit and had written the famous decision in the Dred Scott case. On May
26th Taney issued a writ to Fort McHenry, where Merryman was being detained, to produce
Merryman before the court the following morning (Halbert 1958, 99). The general in command,
at Fort McHenry, General George Cadwallader, refused to produce Merryman on the grounds
that Lincoln had authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (Halbert 1958).
In the famous decision that Taney issued, Ex parte Merryman, he cited various provisions
within the Constitution that proved, in his judgment, that the president had no power to suspend
habeas corpus (McGinty 2011). Essentially those powers only belonged to Congress. Citing
Article I of the Constitution, Taney wrote that, “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
This article is devoted to the legislative department of the United States, and has not the slightest
reference to the executive department” (McGinty 2011, 87). Taney emphasized that the
suspension clause is located in Article I, dealing with the powers of the legislative branch, not
Article II, dealing with executive power (Neely 2011, 65). He further wrote that the president “is
not empowered to arrest any one charged with an offence against the United States, and whom
he may, from the evidence before him, believe to be guilty; nor can he authorize any officer, civil
or military, to exercise this power” (McGinty 2011, 88). This rationale by Taney is unfounded,
as Lincoln himself did not order the arrest of John Merryman and, furthermore, the issue of
arresting someone is separate from the suspension of an individual’s writ of habeas corpus. He
also cited that previous judicial authorities, such as Chief Justice Marshall, had described the
suspension clause as a congressional power (Neely 2011, 65). Thus, according to Taney, Lincoln
had clearly acted unconstitutionally and only Congress, not the president, had the power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
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There were many that agreed with Taney’s argument that Lincoln was usurping power
and playing the role of both Congress and executive in pursuit of his own purposes (White 2009,
417). Many Democrats or southern sympathizers accused Lincoln of many things including
labeling him as a despot, tyrant, and dictator (Halbert 1958, 101). The Baltimore Sun revered
Taney as a hero writing that, “it is not possible to read the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, in the
Merryman case, without an impressive sense of the power of truth, and the convincing logic of
the constitution and laws” (McGinty 2011, 92). Republicans mostly applauded the president’s
decisive action and denounced Taney’s decision. Horace Greely wrote that, “no judge whose
heart was loyal to the Constitution would have given such aid and comfort to public enemies. Of
all the tyrannies that afflict mankind, that of the judiciary is the most insidious, the most
intolerable, the most dangerous” (McGinty 2011, 92).
Lincoln would essentially do nothing following Taney’s decision, neither responding to
Taney’s opinion nor releasing Merryman. Lincoln declined to submit to Taney’s Ex parte
Merryman opinion, not only because it challenged his decision to suspend habeas corpus, but
also because he believed that the Constitution forbade him to submit to Taney’s decision. He
recognized that his duty was “to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution,” not to follow
judicial dictates, and if there was a conflict between these two, he would follow his duty based
upon his own considered sense of what the Constitution required of him (McGinty 2011, 5). He
believed that decisions of the courts were entitled to great respect, however he did not believe
that government policy could be fixed by Supreme Court decisions (McGinty 2011, 4). Lincoln
did not believe that Taney’s decision in Ex parte Merryman controlled his actions as president of
the United States. If Taney derived his power from the judicial article of the Constitution,
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Lincoln derived his power from the executive article of the same founding document (McGinty
2011, 4).
Following the Ex parte Merryman decision, Attorney General Bates, though reluctant to
oppose Taney, supported Lincoln’s suspension. The next few weeks following the decision, he
drafted an argument in favor of Lincoln’s decision, writing that, “in a time like the present, when
the very existence of the Nation is assailed, by a great and dangerous insurrection, the President
has the lawful discretionary power to arrest and hold in custody, persons known to have criminal
intercourse with the insurgents” (Goodwin 2005, 355). It appears that Bates partly wrote this
opinion based upon his position as Attorney General, serving as the chief legal authority for the
country. Also Lincoln has asked Bates to confer with Reverdy Johnson, who strongly supported
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, to publish an opinion (McGinty 2011, 105). Bates
worked with both Johnson and his assistant attorney general to draft his opinion. From a legal
standpoint, Bates stated that the president’s powers to suspend habeas corpus derived from his
duty to “take care that laws be faithfully executed”. Furthermore, if the executive abused his
power, the remedy would be to impeach him, not to subject him to certain decisions of the court
(McGinty 2011).
During the next several weeks into June, Lincoln began drafting the message that he
would be giving to the special session of Congress on July 4th. He worked out his own thoughts,
at times seeking advice from his cabinet members, but mostly writing it himself (McGinty 2011).
Lincoln believed that this message was very important; as it would allow him to both explain to
Congress and to the nation his reasoning behind his decisions thus far into the war. Lincoln
originally wrote the document in a personal voice, but later decided to switch to a more passive
voice in order to give a more objective justification of his actions (McGinty 2011, 98). McGinty
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writes that, “He did not want it to seem that he had assumed the role of a tyrant, for ‘the
appearance of military dictatorship was a matter of deep concern’ to him. He was a constitutional
officer— the president, the chief executive, the commander in chief— and he wanted the public
to know that he understood his role” (98). In Lincoln’s address to Congress, he defended his
actions saying that, as chief executive, he alone was responsible for ensuring that the laws were
executed faithfully (Goodwin 2005). He stated that,
"Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this power. But
the Constitution itself, is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision
was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument
intended, that, in every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be called
together; the very assembling of which might be prevented... by the rebellion”
(Dueholm 2008, 50).
His famous line at the conclusion of his address was, “are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted,
and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” (Goodwin 2005, 355).
Lincoln’s reasoning was that it didn’t make sense to elevate one law, the law that defined who
had the power to suspend habeas corpus, over all other laws (McGinty 2011). He implicitly asks
Congress to authorize his actions, stating that, “In full view of his great responsibility he has so
far done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform
yours” (Miller Center). Lincoln’s speech showed that he had paid attention and did his best to
interpret what his constitutional duty was. He had given serious thought to potentially
suspending habeas corpus before he gave his order to General Scott and he believed that his
order helped the effort to take care that the laws be faithfully executed (McGinty 2011, 102).
Furthermore, he made the decision that he did because Congress was not in session and he had to
make an emergency military decision in the interest of public safety.
Members of Congress were mostly supportive of Lincoln’s decision. Some believed that
Lincoln’s decision to suspend habeas corpus had been necessary but questioned its legality.
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Republican Senator John Sherman from Ohio stated that, “I approve the action of the President. I
believe the President did right. He did precisely what I would have done if I had been in his place
. . . but I cannot here, in my place, under oath, declare that it was strictly legal” (McGinty 2011,
118). There were several Democratic congressmen that did not approve of Lincoln’s decision, as
Democrat John C. Breckinridge denied that one branch of government could “indemnify”
another branch for a violation of the Constitution (McGinty 2011). At this special session of
Congress, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, who was the chairman of the Committee on
Military Affairs and the Militia, attached a measure to a larger bill that raised the pay of troops,
which stated that,
And be it further enacted, That all the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the
United States, after the fourth of March, eighteen hundred and sixty- one, respecting the army
and navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the
States, are hereby approved and in all respects legalized and made valid, to the same intent and
with the same effect as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and
direction of the Congress of the United States (McGinty 2011, 119).
This bill was passed on August 6, 1861 and it essentially retroactively legalized the president’s
military actions thus far into his presidency, including his suspension of habeas corpus. Congress
showed further support of Lincoln’s decision when it passed the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act
in March of 1863. Congress took action to eliminate doubt about the legality of the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus (Neely 1991, 68). Senator Lyman Trumbull drafted the bill, and
Lincoln signed it into law on March 3, 1863. It read that, "during the present rebellion, the
President of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may require it, is
authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the
United States, or any part thereof" (Halbert 1958, 103). The act also established procedures that
had to be followed whenever the writ was suspended (McGinty 2011, 122). The secretary of
state and the secretary of war had to give lists to all federal judges of all of the prisoners detained
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without habeas corpus and also that prisoners were to be held without habeas corpus within a
specific timeline, not indefinitely, and they would be set free if their charges were not addressed
within the timeline (McGinty 2011).
Ultimately, an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 individuals were detained without a prompt
trial due to this suspension (Greenberg 2011). However it is not quite clear whether these
detentions helped the Union in the war or successfully removed threats to public safety as
Lincoln intended it to. For some, this decision represents a clear violation of personal civil
liberties, but others see Lincoln’s decision as a military emergency that he had to make within a
unique situation. There were plenty of individuals that denounced Lincoln as a dictator and a
tyrant and said that he was usurping his presidential power. However Halbert believes that those
were unfounded accusations as he writes, “Lincoln always looked to giving up rather than
seeking power. As early as 1862, he issued an order through the War Department in which he
noted that conditions had improved, and stated that he desired a return to normal procedures. At
that time he directed that all political or state prisoners held by the military be released on their
subscribing to a parole by which they agreed not to aid or comfort the enemy” (1958, 105).
Lincoln lifted his suspension of habeas corpus in February of 1862, although he would ultimately
suspend it again in September of 1863 following the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act in March
of 1863. As controversial as the decision was, Lincoln took his suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus very seriously, relating his feelings by saying that, “I fear you do not fully comprehend
the danger of abridging the liberties of the people. Nothing but the very sternest necessity can
ever justify it. A government had better go to the very extreme of toleration, than to aught that
could be construed into an interference with . . .the common rights of its citizens” (Goodwin
2005, 523).
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Analysis Using the Character Framework
In looking at Lincoln’s decision to suspend habeas corpus in the spring of 1861, can one
identify specific elements of his character that influenced or affected this particular decision?
Some regard this decision as successful and others regard it as a failure, so if this framework
could offer reasoning as to why Lincoln made the decision he did, perhaps it can also tell us
whether, based upon the framework, Lincoln’s behavior led to a successful or unsuccessful
decision. In looking first at the character element of ambition, which involves the motivational
element that a president will use in pursuit of their goals, including enacting transformational
policy and demonstrating self-initiative and inner drive, it appears that ambition did play a small
role in Lincoln’s decision. The suspension of habeas corpus was an extremely transformational
military policy, and while Lincoln didn’t seem to make the decision solely for his own personal
legacy, he certainly demonstrated self-initiative in deciding to suspend it. Lincoln did feel that
his legacy was tied to the war, as he would be remembered in history for whether he saved the
Union or not, so that is an underlying factor within most of his military decisions. In this
situation, he felt that he had to take initiative quickly and because Congress was not yet in
session, he had to act on his own.
Concerning Lincoln’s integrity, I believe that this character element played a large role in
the decision. Integrity deals with one’s ability to stick to their values and ideals when making
decisions, especially putting their convictions to the ultimate test of loss. Lincoln’s integrity was
demonstrated through his address to the special session of Congress when he explained his
reasoning of why he believed he, as the president, had the right to suspend habeas corpus and
also why he ignored Chief Justice Taney’s decision. McGinty writes that, “Lincoln was a man of
strong convictions and even stronger instincts. Endowed with a rigorously logical mind and keen
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powers of analysis and judgment, he was convinced that Taney’s decisions in Dred Scott and Ex
parte Merryman were both egregiously wrong, and he was determined to do what he could to see
to it that they ultimately did not prevail” (McGinty 2011, 3). Lincoln convinced himself, and also
convinced Congress, that his decision that was not in violation of the Constitution and he stuck
to these beliefs despite criticism from others. Halbert writes that, “Two things are abundantly
clear from the record. The first is that Lincoln honestly and sincerely believed that he had the
right to do what he did . . .The second thing to be noted is the fact that he exercised the power,
which he believed that he had, reluctantly and sparingly” (1958, 105). Lincoln’s decision to
suspend habeas corpus in April of 1861 could have led to more violent riots in Baltimore, attacks
on Washington or on Union troops attempting to get to Washington. It also could have led to the
secession of Maryland, which would have been extremely detrimental to the Union. Halbert
emphasizes that during this time, Maryland, as a state, was volatile and many feared that it would
secede, including Lincoln, but despite Lincoln’s decision, Maryland never left the Union and the
capital was never attacked (1958, 98). Lincoln made the decision to suspend habeas corpus
knowing that it was controversial and possibly detrimental to the Union, but he believed that he
had to do everything in his power to faithfully execute the laws and protect the public. It was a
risk that he had to take, as he expressed in his address to Congress that he felt that he was
justified in violating one law in order to save the Union.
Next I turn to relatedness, which is the way in which a president treats his staff and
advisers and how he interacts with them in meaningful ways. This particular situation happened
just when Lincoln had been inaugurated, and, because of this, I believe that Lincoln more
actively sought out advice from his cabinet and other advisers and he was able to have more
meaningful dialogue with them. In making the decision to suspend habeas corpus, Lincoln
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solicited the advice of his cabinet members and he spoke to Attorney General Bates, who
directed him to individuals that would help him look into legal issues concerning the suspension.
The president also conferred with men outside the government whose opinions he respected,
such as Reverdy Johnson, who was a prominent Baltimore lawyer (McGinty 2011, 83). After
listening to Johnson and others within his cabinet, and also consulting with General Scott on the
military necessities he faced, Lincoln made his decision. As Lincoln’s biographer James G.
Randall later wrote, “few measures of the Lincoln administration were adopted with more
reluctance than this suspension of the citizen’s safeguard against arbitrary arrest” (McGinty
2011, 84). Despite this reluctance, Lincoln sought out the opinions and advice of many people
both within and outside of his cabinet and he clearly took into account their different opinions in
making his final decision.
Lincoln’s emotional intelligence also seemed to be evident within this decision. Lincoln
was inaugurated in early March of 1861 and from the minute that he took his presidential oath,
he was plunged into making high-pressure decisions an in attempt to keep the Union from further
falling apart. Dealing with the issue of Maryland was not his only problem, as he was constantly
conferring with his cabinet and advisers, welcoming state officials to the White House,
transforming and improving the Union army, and dealing with other border states that were on
the verge of secession (McGinty 2011). Anyone in Lincoln’s position would experience a certain
amount of stress and pressure, but despite the difficult circumstances that shaped Lincoln’s early
months of his presidency, he was able to separate his personal feelings or personal hardships
from the way that he did his job.
Turning to good judgment, which includes a president’s ability to match solutions to
circumstances and also how they identify problems and devise appropriate solutions, it is
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arguable whether Lincoln employed good judgment. Lincoln felt that he had to make a decision
that would be controversial, but he clearly identified the problem that if he allowed the riots in
Baltimore to continue, the capital would continue to be threatened and Union troops would
continue to be in danger. While he was able to clearly identify this problem, one could argue that
his solution to suspend habeas corpus was not the right solution. There were individuals that
thought that Lincoln’s actions were not legal and that he did not have the authority to suspend
habeas corpus. Halbert writes that, “Admittedly, some of the things that happened during the
suspension of the writ shock our peace time feelings concerning civil liberties, but how much
better it was that Lincoln took the course that he did, rather than to follow the pattern set by some
of our modern day governments in dealing with political opponents” (1958, 107). However, one
can ask the question what other choices did Lincoln have and did he truly have a viable
alternative? He felt it necessary that there be troops within the capital and if he didn’t make the
decision that he did, then attacks on Union soldiers could have continued and there could have
been attacks on a defenseless Washington.
Finally I will look at the element of political leadership, which involves a president’s
ability to mobilize, orchestrate, and consolidate public opinion. The best example demonstrating
Lincoln’s political leadership is Lincoln’s address to the special session of Congress on July 4th.
While he gave his message directly to Congress, Lincoln knew that the address also gave him a
public platform in which to explain his decisions to the rest of the country (McGinty 2011).
Despite this opportunity, opinions regarding Lincoln’s decision were mostly divided by political
party; with Republicans largely supporting his decision and Democrats disapproving of it. He
certainly was able to demonstrate strong charisma in his explanation of his actions, both to
Congress and to the public. His decision proved to be polarizing despite his clearly developed
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rationale, however that isn’t surprising within the context of a war and he did make an effective
and widely accepted attempt to defend his actions.
From this analysis of the character framework concerning Lincoln’s decision to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus, it seems that Lincoln’s character offers an explanation for how this
decision can be understood as successful. Lincoln’s integrity and relatedness seemed to be the
most evident factors within this decision, however one could argue that he either demonstrated
good judgment or that he failed in this areas. I believe that he did demonstrate good judgment in
that he was able to recognize that problem that he faced and he felt that he had no other
alternative solution than to suspend habeas corpus. Regarding his political leadership, I believe
that it isn’t very significant within the decision. Lincoln was largely able to mobilize public
opinion through his address to Congress and even though there was not unanimous support or
agreement, this element did not strongly affect the outcome of the decision.
Analysis Using the Strategic Action Framework
Turning to the strategic action framework, it will be important to analyze whether this
framework can help us to understand whether this decision can be viewed as a success or as a
failure. First looking at vantage points, which are the way that a president uses the powers that
are built into the Constitution, it is clear that Lincoln understood and fully utilized the powers
that were within the Constitution. Lincoln, while reluctant at first to suspend habeas corpus,
understood his role as executive authority and commander in chief, and he believed that this gave
him the power to make emergency military decisions in order to suppress the rebellion. It seems
that Lincoln became more convinced of this role as he gathered information and sought the
advice of others around. He was able to convince Congress that he had acted faithfully to the
Constitution, but through his decision-making process, he also convinced himself of his decision.
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Later in his presidency when asked whether he truly thought he had the power to suspend habeas
corpus, he stated that, “By necessary implication, when rebellion or invasion comes, the decision
is to be made, from time to time; and I think the man whom, for the time, the people have, under
the constitution, made the commander-in-chief of their Army and Navy, is the man who holds
the power” (Dueholm 2008, 52). Thus, I believe that Lincoln clearly demonstrated an
understanding of his vantage points and used them to his advantage.
Next concerning an individual’s sense of power, which is how necessary a president feels
power is to achieving their aims, I believe, in this situation, that Lincoln did feel that he needed a
significant amount of power in order to suspend habeas corpus. He sought out the advice of
many others in making sure that he had this power, also making sure that he would have their
support, and it seems that he recognized that he needed to have power in order to achieve his
aims of suppressing the rebellion. From this decision, and with the approval of Congress,
Lincoln was able to amass more power than any president has. Halbert writes that, “Congress, in
the face of this claim, chose to do nothing to assert the exclusive right, which some claimed for
it, until Lincoln had exercised the right, which he claimed, unimpeded for almost two years.
When Congress did act, it made no positive claim to an exclusive right, and in fact tendered to
Lincoln more power than he had ever indicated he wished in connection with suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus” (1958, 113). Congress did place limitations on the
conditions wherein habeas corpus could be suspended, but their authorization still placed a
significant amount of power with the executive.
Next I turn to professional reputation, which is how others within the Washington
community view how astute the president is in utilizing his powers. Lincoln’s decision was
viewed positively for the most part, having the support of his cabinet and most Republicans. The
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support of Congress is perhaps the best example of Lincoln’s strong professional reputation, as
the majority of congressmen felt that Lincoln was adept at using his powers, as they approved of
his action to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Attorney General Bates’ opinion concerning
Lincoln’s decision also is an example of strong professional reputation, as Bates, while
apprehensive to disagree with Taney, supported Lincoln and his decision, arguing that the
president is authorized to suspend the writ because he is responsible for the preservation of the
public safety and that the power of suspension flows from the president's power to make
warrantless arrests (Dueholm 2008, 50). Not all agreed with the legality of Lincoln’s decision,
such as Senator John Sherman from Ohio, but the majority of the Washington community, save
for a sector of Democrats, respected the way that Lincoln made his decision. Looking at public
prestige, which is how favorable the Washington community believes the public is of a
president’s decision, it seems that this element was not evident within this decision. With the
support of Congress and others within the Washington community, it seems that public opinion
was not critical within the situation.
Finally looking at political power, which is a president’s ability to demonstrate control
and authority when dealing with decision-making and whether they are able to persuade others
around them using the bargaining advantages they have. In this particular situation, I believe that
Lincoln definitely demonstrated control and authority dealing with the situation to suspend
habeas corpus, however I don’t think that he necessarily had to persuade or convince others of
what he was doing. There is some evidence that shows that Lincoln was more so following the
advice of his cabinet and advisers, but ultimately he himself recognized the advice that was given
to him and, as a leader, made the ultimate decision to suspend habeas corpus. In Lincoln’s
conversations with his cabinet and close advisers, he actually seemed to be persuaded by others
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to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, as evidenced by Secretary of State Seward’s comment that
he ultimately persuaded Lincoln to finally make the decision. With the demonstration of the
other elements of vantage points, individual sense of power, and professional reputation, I
believe that there is enough evidence to conclude that Lincoln’s behavior is mostly compatible
with the strategic action framework and that it can help to explain how Lincoln’s decision can be
understood as successful.
Conclusion
From the analysis of these two frameworks, it seems that both of them seem to suggest
that, based upon Lincoln’s character and use of strategic resources, that his decision was a
success. The consensus among most individuals within Washington was that while Lincoln’s
decision may have been a violation of civil liberties, he did what he thought he had to do not
having the ability to go to Congress. Also his intentions were focused upon protecting the public.
Lincoln’s later decision in September of 1863 to re-suspend habeas corpus may be viewed much
more harshly, however his decision in the spring of 1861 was decided out of military necessity
and Congress supported and granted Lincoln that power. I believe that the character framework
offers important insights concerning Lincoln’s integrity and his judgment and that the strategic
action framework demonstrates Lincoln’s ability to understand his role as executive through his
vantage points and his individual sense of power, thus I conclude that both frameworks help us
to understand this decision in useful ways.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
One of the central questions that arose when considering these three cases, is what
constitutes a successful or unsuccessful decision? The question of what is a successful decision is
largely a subjective one, but I believe that, while there will almost always be arguments that can
regard the same decision as both successful or unsuccessful, there is usually a consensus reached
by the majority of scholars and historians about a decision’s outcome. The way that I have
defined success within my research is based upon how a particular decision achieved a
president’s, i.e. Lincoln’s, larger aims and whether it was able to positively impact a certain
situation, with my research focusing on the situation of the Civil War.
Concerning these cases, an interesting factor to note is that the discussion of the success
or failure of these decisions would be very different if the Union had lost the war. Abraham
Lincoln is revered by the large majority of scholars as one of our greatest presidents, but it is
likely that he would not be viewed in this way if the Union Army had been defeated. Also there
could have been many different outcomes from the decisions that have just been discussed. What
if the majority of slaves freed from the Emancipation Proclamation had decided to fight for the
Confederacy or if the freed slaves had revolted against both sides, Union and Confederate? What
if Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus had ultimately led to Maryland seceding from the
Union? Of course it is easy to ask these “what if” questions looking retroactively at history, but it
is important to acknowledge that Lincoln’s success can largely be attributed to the fact that he
achieved his larger aim of saving the Union and winning the war.
In looking at my conclusions of each of the three cases, first, with Lincoln’s decision to
issue the Emancipation Proclamation I concluded that the character theoretical framework better
captures the essence of Lincoln’s decision, especially because the decision was largely conceived
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of and developed by Lincoln alone. The presence of Lincoln’s ambition and his integrity were
important factors that positively affected his political leadership and judgment, and I believe that
the presence of these factors within Lincoln’s character allow for a plausible explanation of the
decision’s success. Lincoln demonstrated strong ambition in that he had a strong sense of inner
drive and self-initiative and he enacted truly transformational policy in issuing the Emancipation
and also demonstrated strong integrity by his willingness to take large political risks. Regarding
the strategic action framework, which is based upon persuasion and strategic bargaining with
others, because the decision to issue the proclamation was so solitary, this framework was unable
to provide a useful theoretical explanation.
Second, regarding Lincoln’s mismanagement of General McClellan, I believe that both of
the theoretical frameworks can offer credible explanations for why Lincoln’s decisions
concerning General McClellan can be understood as failures. The lack of relatedness and good
judgment within Lincoln’s character can be identified as factors that led to the failed decision.
Lincoln strongly exerted time and effort in trying to relate to McClellan, and his desire to be able
to relate with McClellan caused a lack of relatedness with the rest of his cabinet and advisers.
Lincoln’s also demonstrated poor judgment in that he deferred numerous times to the judgment
of General McClellan, despite his own concerns about McClellan’s military actions (or
inactions). Within the strategic action framework, Lincoln’s failure to use his vantage points well
and his resulting poor professional reputation led to a lack of political power. Lincoln’s failure to
use his vantage points as commander in chief resulted in McClellan defying numerous military
orders from Lincoln, which in turn weakened his professional reputation among his cabinet and
the Washington community. Lincoln fails to act in the ways that both of these frameworks
stipulate are necessary for a successful decision. The use of the two frameworks offer
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complementary explanations, as I concluded that the strategic action framework is more useful in
explaining why the decision was a failure, and the character framework better explains why
Lincoln individually made the decisions that he did.
The third case, Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, at first I believed was a mixed
decision, one that could be equally regarded as both a failure and as a success, however after
analyzing the case more clearly, I think the decision was largely a success. The character
framework offers important insights into the presence of the factors of integrity and good
judgment, as Lincoln strongly stuck to his own personal values, despite the potential large risks,
regarding his decision to suspend habeas corpus. He also demonstrated good judgment in that he
clearly identified the problem he faced for what it was and he decided upon a course of action
that he thought would be the most appropriate given the situation. The strategic action
framework shows Lincoln’s use of his vantage points and his individual sense of power. Lincoln
recognized and understood his authority as commander in chief in that he had the ability and the
duty to make military decisions in emergency situations. The use of his vantage points
influenced his individual sense of power in that Lincoln identified and verified his ability to
assert a greater amount of power in an emergency situation at a time when Congress was not in
session.
In my initial development of the two theoretical frameworks, the first largely based upon
work by Stanley Renshon and the second based upon the work of Richard Neustadt, I was
skeptical about the usefulness of solely employing the character framework to explain
presidential decision-making, which is why I developed the strategic action framework as a
comparative way of examining presidential decisions. The two theoretical frameworks are
presented as different ways in which to analyze and understand a decision, but upon employing
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them in the use of looking at the three cases, I found that they actually contain some similarities.
The persuasive ability that is central to the strategic action framework turned out to be very
similar to the factor of political leadership within the character framework. Political leadership
entails the ability to mobilize, orchestrate, and consolidate the public and much of those tasks
entail some level of persuasion. Also political power within the strategic action framework ended
up being largely similar to the combined factors of political leadership and good judgment.
Political leadership, the ability to mobilize, orchestrate, and consolidate public opinion, and good
judgment, involving risk assessment and a clear ability to identify problems, when occurring
together, resembled what political power is within the strategic action framework, which is the
demonstration of control and authority in dealing with each specific decision and an ability to
persuade those around them. In terms of the worth of using each of the models, I believe that my
analysis demonstrates the value of the models in understanding the success or failure of
presidential decision-making. The models were able to provide plausible explanations for why
decisions were successful or unsuccessful, as when Lincoln acted accordingly to the models his
decisions were largely successful and when he did not act in ways that were outlined by the
models his decisions were largely unsuccessful. I believe that these frameworks can also be
valuable for looking at presidential decision-making in crisis situations. Lincoln made all of the
three decisions within the crisis of the Civil War and the war certainly put added challenges and
a significant amount of pressure on Lincoln when making decisions.
After analyzing the three separate cases, there are factors within each of the individual
frameworks that I believe to have played a larger role in these three decisions. Within the
character framework, the factors of integrity and relatedness seemed to be crucial factors that had
a substantial effect on good judgment. Ambition and emotional intelligence were not irrelevant
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factors, but they seemed to be factors that were underlying each of the decisions simply based
upon the situation in which Lincoln was making decisions. Historical legacy, one of the
components within ambition, was a significant factor that impacted Lincoln’s decision-making,
as in each of the decisions there was the question of would he be remembered as the Union’s
savior or the man that destroyed the Union? Emotional intelligence was also a factor that was a
recurring factor in each decision, but didn’t significantly impact whether a decision was
successful or unsuccessful.
Regarding the strategic action framework, vantage points and professional reputation
were factors that appeared to more significantly affect Lincoln’s decision-making. When Lincoln
more successfully used his vantage points and had a strong professional reputation, Lincoln had
more political power, which led to the success of his decisions. The other factors of individual
sense of power and public prestige are not irrelevant, but within the decisions that were
examined, they did not have as much of an effect.
My research does not come without limitations however. One of the limitations that can
be identified is my choice of looking at Lincoln. The unique situation of the Civil War allowed
Lincoln the opportunity to redefine his powers and take action in a way that no president had
done, but that also means that there is no other president that had to make decisions that
Lincoln’s can be compared to. A second limitation was the sheer volume of information that has
been published about Lincoln. There are certainly other historical biographies and scholarly
work that could have been employed; however in order to stay consistent, I tried to refer to
several of the most well-known and cited Lincoln biographies and sources.
In conclusion, I believe that my research has provided two valuable frameworks in which
to analyze presidential decision-making. While the frameworks cannot predict the success or
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failure of decisions, they provide a way in which to better understand the outcomes of decisions,
especially when looking at decisions made within crisis situations. Lincoln, as both a president
and an individual, provided an extremely unique and fascinating case in which to further analyze.
Future research utilizing these models can be employed in examining key decisions of additional
presidents in order to better test the applicability of the two frameworks. Can these frameworks
be useful when presidents are not making decisions within crisis situations? Will these
frameworks be able to better explain certain decisions over others? Would one find different
results examining the decisions of additional presidents? All of these questions are future
research opportunities. From my individual research, I have discovered that the amount of work
that has been published about Lincoln is a true testament to the fascination with which his life
and his presidency deserves. While my research may only be a small contribution to the field of
study of Lincoln and his presidency, I am humbled by the opportunity to have studied and
conducted research on an individual that is as revered as Abraham Lincoln is.
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